跳到主要内容

企业、成本、增长与竞争

Pearson Edexcel · International A-Level · 经济学 · 知识点 5

本主题的视频课程 打开视频页面
26:20

企业、成本、增长与竞争

本主题围绕企业展开:企业如何成长、目标是什么、收入与成本如何表现,以及从完全竞争到……的市场结构。

英文讲解 · 可切换中英文字幕

5.1

企业、成本、增长与竞争

English

Why it matters. From 2014 to 2016 two ride-hailing firms fought for China's cities. Didi Chuxing and Uber China both paid drivers bonuses and gave passengers discounts, so many rides cost less than the petrol used. Uber's founder said the company was losing more than US$1 billion a year in China. In August 2016 the price war ended the way such wars often end: Didi bought Uber China, and Uber took a share of the combined company. Passengers soon noticed fewer discounts and higher fares at busy times. Why do some firms grow by buying rivals? Why can a market with only a few big firms behave so differently from one with thousands of small ones? This unit builds the theory of the firm: its objectives, its costs, and the market structures it competes in.

In this unit you will:

  • classify businesses and explain how and why they grow, or stay small;
  • compare business objectives, including profit and revenue maximisation and the principal–agent problem;
  • calculate revenue, costs and profit, and apply the shutdown and break-even rules;
  • explain economies and diseconomies of scale and the four kinds of efficiency;
  • analyse perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, monopoly, monopsony and contestable markets.
5.1

企业、收入、成本与利润 (3.3.1-3.3.2)

English

Businesses come in several types 类型:

  • private-sector firms owned by shareholders or a sole owner, usually for profit;
  • public-sector organisations such as state-owned enterprises 国有企业 (State Grid, China's national power network);
  • not-for-profit organisations, which reinvest any surplus instead of paying it to owners (Wikipedia, many hospitals and charities);
  • co-operatives 合作社, owned by their members with one vote each (Spain's Mondragon group employs about 70,000 people, most of them member-owners);
  • joint ventures 合资企业, where two firms share a project, its risk and its control (SAIC-Volkswagen, founded in Shanghai in 1985).

Firms range from SMEs 中小企业 (small and medium enterprises) to huge corporations. China often describes its SMEs with "56789": they pay about 50% of taxes, produce over 60% of GDP, account for over 70% of innovation and 80% of urban jobs, and make up over 90% of firms.

Firms grow in two ways. Organic growth 内部增长 uses reinvested profit to add products or outlets. External growth comes from mergers 合并 and takeovers 收购:

  • horizontal integration 横向整合: buying a rival at the same stage, as when Didi and Kuaidi merged in 2015, and Didi then bought Uber China;
  • backward vertical integration 后向纵向整合: buying a supplier. BYD makes its own batteries for its electric cars;
  • forward vertical integration 前向纵向整合: buying a customer stage, such as a brewer buying pubs or a phone maker opening its own shops;
  • conglomerate integration 混合整合: buying an unrelated business to spread risk, as India's Tata Group owns steel, cars, tea and software firms.

Integration can secure supplies, cut costs and reduce competition, but it is expensive, company cultures can clash, and a bigger firm attracts regulators. Firms stay small when the market is local, finance is hard to get, owners want to keep control, or regulation is heavy. Growth affects firms (market power, scale), workers (new jobs, but also restructuring) and consumers (lower prices, or less choice). Sometimes firms reverse it with a demerger 分拆: General Electric split into three separate companies in 2023–2024 because managing aircraft engines, power equipment and medical scanners together had become inefficient.

Three rows showing horizontal, vertical and conglomerate integration as two firms joining into one
Horizontal integration joins firms at the same stage, vertical joins different stages of one industry, conglomerate joins different industries
词汇 训练
English 中文 拼音
types 类型 lèi xíng
state-owned enterprises 国有企业 guó yǒu qǐ yè
co-operatives 合作社 hé zuò shè
joint ventures/dʒɔɪnt ˈventʃəz/ 合资企业 hé zī qǐ yè
SMEs 中小企业 zhōng xiǎo qǐ yè
organic growth/ɔːˈɡænɪk ɡrəʊθ/ 内部增长 nèi bù zēng zhǎng
mergers/ˈmɜːdʒəz/ 合并 hé bìng
takeovers/ˈteɪkəʊvəz/ 收购 shōu gòu
horizontal integration/ˌhɒrɪˈzɒntl ˌɪntɪˈɡreɪʃn/ 横向整合 héng xiàng zhěng hé
backward vertical integration/ˈbækwəd ˈvɜːtɪkl ˌɪntɪˈɡreɪʃn/ 后向纵向整合 hòu xiàng zòng xiàng zhěng hé
forward vertical integration/ˈfɔːwəd ˈvɜːtɪkl ˌɪntɪˈɡreɪʃn/ 前向纵向整合 qián xiàng zòng xiàng zhěng hé
conglomerate integration/kənˈɡlɒməreɪt ˌɪntɪˈɡreɪʃn/ 混合整合 hùn hé zhěng hé
demerger/deˈmɜːdʒə/ 分拆 fēn chāi
5.1

企业、收入、成本与利润 (3.3.1-3.3.2)

English

Firms can pursue different objectives:

  • profit maximisation 利润最大化: produce where marginal revenue equals marginal cost ($MR = MC$). If one more unit adds more to revenue than to cost, make it; if it adds more to cost, do not;
  • revenue maximisation 收入最大化: produce where $MR = 0$, because then one more unit adds nothing to revenue;
  • sales volume maximisation 销量最大化: the largest output that still covers costs, where average revenue equals average total cost ($AR = ATC$);
  • satisficing 满意化: in Herbert Simon's theory, managers aim for a result that is "good enough" for all the groups they must keep happy, not the maximum.

Why would a firm not maximise profit? In large companies there is a divorce of ownership from control: shareholders (the principals) own the firm, but managers (the agents) run it. Managers may prefer a bigger firm, a higher salary or an easy life. This is the principal–agent problem 委托代理问题. Firms try to solve it by paying managers partly in shares.

Worked example: objectives on the model.

  • The firm's demand (average revenue) is $P = 70 - Q/2$, so $TR = 70Q - Q^2/2$ and $MR = 70 - Q$. For a straight-line demand curve, MR is twice as steep as AR.
  • At $Q = 40$: $P = 50$, $TR = 2000$ and $MR = 30$, still positive.
  • Revenue is greatest where $MR = 0$: $Q = 70$, $P = 35$, $TR = 2450$ — the point where PED is −1, as in Unit 1.
Average and marginal revenue on the shared model
AR and MR on the model: MR is twice as steep as AR, and revenue peaks where MR = 0 at Q = 70
词汇 训练
English 中文 拼音
profit maximisation/ˈprɒfɪt ˌmæksɪmaɪˈzeɪʃn/ 利润最大化 lì rùn zuì dà huà
revenue maximisation/ˈrevənjuː ˌmæksɪmaɪˈzeɪʃn/ 收入最大化 shōu rù zuì dà huà
sales volume maximisation 销量最大化 xiāo liàng zuì dà huà
satisficing/ˈsætɪsfɪsɪŋ/ 满意化 mǎn yì huà
principal–agent problem 委托代理问题 wěi tuō dài lǐ wèn tí
5.1

企业、收入、成本与利润 (3.3.1-3.3.2)

English

Revenue: total revenue $TR = P \times Q$; average revenue $AR = TR/Q$, which is the demand curve; marginal revenue $MR = \Delta TR / \Delta Q$. When demand is price elastic, MR is positive and a price cut raises revenue; when inelastic, MR is negative.

Costs: in the short run at least one factor, such as the factory, is fixed. Adding more workers to a fixed factory eventually brings the law of diminishing returns 收益递减规律: each extra worker adds less output than the one before, because they share the same machines and space. So marginal cost first falls (as workers specialise) and then rises.

  • $TC = TFC + TVC$ (total fixed plus total variable cost)
  • $ATC = TC/Q$, $AVC = TVC/Q$, $MC = \Delta TC / \Delta Q$

Worked example: a cost table.

Total fixed cost is 12. Total variable cost for 1 to 9 units is 5, 9, 12, 14, 17, 21, 26, 32 and 39.

  • MC (the change in TVC) is 5, 4, 3, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7: falling, then rising once diminishing returns set in.
  • AVC is lowest at $Q = 5$: $17/5 = 3.4$.
  • ATC is lowest at $Q = 7$: $(12 + 26)/7 = 5.43$.
  • MC cuts both AVC and ATC at their lowest points.

Marginal product and marginal cost are mirror images: when an extra worker adds a lot of output, the extra cost per unit is low. In the long run every factor can change, so the firm can choose a new scale.

Profit is $TR - TC$. Normal profit 正常利润 is the minimum return that keeps the owner in the industry; economists count it as a cost inside ATC. Supernormal profit 超额利润 is any profit above that ($P > ATC$), and a loss means $P < ATC$.

  • Short-run shutdown: produce nothing if $P < \min AVC$ (3.4 here). Below that price, revenue does not even cover the variable costs. Between AVC and ATC, the firm keeps trading at a loss, because its fixed costs must be paid anyway.
  • Long-run exit: leave the industry if $P < \min ATC$ (5.43 here).

Airlines show the short-run rule. In 2020 many flew nearly empty planes, because fares still covered fuel and crew (variable costs) while the aircraft leases (fixed costs) had to be paid whether they flew or not.

Short-run cost curves with shutdown and break-even
The cost table plotted: MC cuts AVC at its minimum (3.4 at Q = 5) and ATC at its minimum (5.43 at Q = 7)
探索

新增销售收入与原有销量的降价损失

区分新增单位的收入与原有单位的降价损失,并区分区间边际收入与点导数。

词汇 训练
English 中文 拼音
law of diminishing returns/lɔː ɒv dɪˈmɪnɪʃɪŋ rɪˈtɜːnz/ 收益递减规律 shōu yì dì jiǎn guī lǜ
normal profit/ˈnɔːml ˈprɒfɪt/ 正常利润 zhèng cháng lì rùn
supernormal profit/ˈsuːpənɔːml ˈprɒfɪt/ 超额利润 chāo é lì rùn
5.1

企业、收入、成本与利润 (3.3.1-3.3.2)

English

In the long run, average cost changes with the scale of production. The long-run average cost 长期平均成本 (LRAC) curve falls while the firm enjoys economies of scale 规模经济, flattens at the minimum efficient scale 最小有效规模 (MES), the smallest output at which average cost is lowest, and rises if diseconomies of scale 规模不经济 set in.

Internal economies of scale (inside the firm):

  • technical: bigger machines are cheaper per unit of output. Maersk's Triple-E container ships of 2013 each carried about 18,000 containers, with much lower fuel and crew cost per container than older ships;
  • purchasing: bulk discounts;
  • financial: large firms borrow more cheaply;
  • managerial: specialist managers;
  • marketing: advertising costs spread over more sales;
  • risk-bearing: a range of products spreads risk.

External economies of scale 外部规模经济 come from the growth of the whole industry in one place: skilled workers, suppliers, transport links and shared knowledge. Shenzhen's electronics cluster around Huaqiangbei lets a start-up find parts, engineers and factories within an hour's drive.

Diseconomies of scale come from communication and coordination problems in very large organisations, and from X-inefficiency X低效率: costs drift above their lowest possible level when there is no competitive pressure.

A large steel plant: scale can affect average cost
A large steel plant: huge fixed costs spread over very large output give economies of scale
Long-run average cost with minimum efficient scale
LRAC falls with economies of scale until the minimum efficient scale, then rises with diseconomies
词汇 训练
English 中文 拼音
long-run average cost 长期平均成本 cháng qī píng jūn chéng běn
economies of scale/ɪˈkɒnəmiz ɒv skeɪl/ 规模经济 guī mó jīng jì
minimum efficient scale/ˈmɪnɪməm ɪˈfɪʃənt skeɪl/ 最小有效规模 zuì xiǎo yǒu xiào guī mó
diseconomies of scale/ˌdɪsɪˈkɒnəmiz ɒv skeɪl/ 规模不经济 guī mó bù jīng jì
external economies of scale/ekˈstɜːnl ɪˈkɒnəmiz ɒv skeɪl/ 外部规模经济 wài bù guī mó jīng jì
X-inefficiency/eks ɪnɪˈfɪʃənsi/ X低效率 X dī xiào lǜ
5.2

市场结构与可竞争性 (3.3.3)

English

Economists use four kinds of efficiency 效率:

  • allocative efficiency 配置效率: $P = MC$; the price buyers pay equals the cost of the last unit, so the right amount is produced;
  • productive efficiency 生产效率: output at the lowest point of ATC;
  • dynamic efficiency 动态效率: investment and innovation over time, often paid for by profits;
  • X-inefficiency: producing above the lowest possible cost.

A concentration ratio 集中度 adds the market shares of the largest firms. If five firms have shares of 40%, 25%, 15%, 10% and 10%, the four-firm ratio is $CR_4 = 40 + 25 + 15 + 10 = 90\%$: a concentrated market. China's mobile network market, shared almost entirely between China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom, has a three-firm ratio close to 100%. A high ratio suggests market power, but it ignores foreign competition and the threat of new entrants.

Concentration ratio
Five firms with shares 40, 25, 15, 10 and 10: the four-firm concentration ratio is 90%
词汇 训练
English 中文 拼音
efficiency/ɪˈfɪʃənsi/ 效率 xiào lǜ
allocative efficiency/ˈæləkətɪv ɪˈfɪʃənsi/ 配置效率 pèi zhì xiào lǜ
productive efficiency/prəˈdʌktɪv ɪˈfɪʃənsi/ 生产效率 shēng chǎn xiào lǜ
dynamic efficiency/daɪˈnæmɪk ɪˈfɪʃənsi/ 动态效率 dòng tài xiào lǜ
concentration ratio/ˌkɒnsənˈtreɪʃn ˈreɪʃɪəʊ/ 集中度 jí zhōng dù
5.2

市场结构与可竞争性 (3.3.3)

English

Perfect competition 完全竞争 assumes many small firms, identical products, perfect information and free entry and exit. Each firm is a price taker 价格接受者: it sells at the market price, so $P = AR = MR$. It maximises profit where $MC = MR$. Supernormal profits attract new firms, which pushes the price down to $\min ATC$; in the long run firms earn only normal profit, and the market is both productively and allocatively efficient. Markets for wheat or rice come close: no single farmer can change the world price.

Monopolistic competition 垄断竞争 has many firms selling differentiated 差异化的 products — different in features, in branding, or in where and how they are sold. Milk-tea shops are a good example: each has its own recipes and brand, so it faces a downward-sloping demand curve and can raise prices a little without losing every customer. Short-run supernormal profits attract new shops, and in the long run profit returns to normal. Price stays above MC and firms produce below their lowest-cost output (excess capacity), so the market is not allocatively or productively efficient.

Oligopoly 寡头垄断 means a few large, interdependent 相互依存的 firms: each must think about how its rivals will react. Oligopolies are protected by barriers to entry 进入壁垒: economies of scale, patents, strong brands, sunk costs 沉没成本 (costs that cannot be recovered on exit, such as advertising) and legal limits, and sometimes by limit pricing 限制性定价 — keeping prices just low enough to make entry unprofitable.

Game theory shows why oligopolists are tempted to cooperate, and why cooperation breaks down. In the two-firm game below, each firm's best move is to compete whatever the other does, so both end at the Nash equilibrium 纳什均衡 (2, 2), although colluding (4, 4) would pay both better. Collusion 共谋 can be formal, as in a cartel 卡特尔 such as OPEC, or tacit, as in price leadership, where firms follow one leader's prices. It is illegal in most countries: in 2016 the European Commission fined five lorry makers a record €2.93 billion for fixing prices for 14 years. Collusion raises producers' profits at the expense of consumers.

Oligopolists compete on price through price wars 价格战 (the Didi–Uber subsidies), predatory pricing 掠夺性定价 (pricing below cost to drive a rival out) and limit pricing. They also use non-price competition 非价格竞争: advertising and branding, quality, celebrity endorsement, product placement and after-sales service. These have costs and benefits for firms, consumers, employees and suppliers.

A monopoly 垄断 is a single seller protected by barriers to entry. It maximises profit where $MR = MC$ and charges the highest price buyers will pay for that output.

Worked example: monopoly on the model.

  • Demand (AR) is $P = 70 - Q/2$, so $MR = 70 - Q$. Marginal cost is $MC = 10 + Q/2$.
  • Set $MR = MC$: $70 - Q = 10 + Q/2$, so $Q_m = 40$.
  • Price from the demand curve: $P_m = 70 - 20 = 50$.
  • With $ATC = 30$ at this output, supernormal profit $= (50 - 30) \times 40 = 800$.
  • A competitive market would produce where $P = MC$: $70 - Q/2 = 10 + Q/2$, so $Q_c = 60$ and $P_c = 40$.
  • The monopoly charges 10 more, sells 20 fewer, and causes a deadweight loss 无谓损失 of $\tfrac12 \times 20 \times (50 - 30) = 200$.

A natural monopoly 自然垄断 exists when one firm can supply the whole market at a lower average cost than two or more firms could, usually because of a huge network: one national power grid is cheaper than two. Governments regulate natural monopolies rather than break them up.

Third-degree price discrimination 三级价格歧视 means charging different groups different prices for the same product. It needs market power, groups with different price elasticities, and no way to resell between groups. Student discounts on train tickets and cheaper cinema seats on weekday mornings are examples. The firm gains producer surplus; groups with elastic demand pay less, and groups with inelastic demand pay more.

Monopoly is neither allocatively nor productively efficient, but its profits can pay for research, so it may be dynamically efficient.

Monopoly profit maximisation on the shared model
Monopoly: MR = MC at Q = 40; price 50 on AR; profit 800 shaded; deadweight loss 200 compared with the competitive 60 at 40
The prisoners' dilemma
Each firm does better by competing whatever the other does, so both end at (2, 2) though colluding would give (4, 4)
探索

最佳反应与稳定结果

固定对手的选择,比较一家企业自己的收益。联合利润较高的结果未必能抵御单方改变策略。

词汇 训练
English 中文 拼音
perfect competition/ˈpɜːfekt ˌkɒmpəˈtɪʃn/ 完全竞争 wán quán jìng zhēng
price taker/praɪs ˈteɪkə/ 价格接受者 jià gé jiē shòu zhě
monopolistic competition/məˈnɒpəlɪstɪk ˌkɒmpəˈtɪʃn/ 垄断竞争 lǒng duàn jìng zhēng
differentiated/ˌdɪfəˈrenʃɪeɪtɪd/ 差异化的 chā yì huà de
oligopoly/ˌɒlɪˈɡɒpəli/ 寡头垄断 guǎ tóu lǒng duàn
interdependent/ˌɪntədɪˈpendənt/ 相互依存的 xiāng hù yī cún de
barriers to entry/ˈbærɪəz tʊ ˈentri/ 进入壁垒 jìn rù bì lěi
sunk costs 沉没成本 chén mò chéng běn
limit pricing/ˈlɪmɪt ˈpraɪsɪŋ/ 限制性定价 xiàn zhì xìng dìng jià
Nash equilibrium/næʃ ˌiːkwɪˈlɪbrɪəm/ 纳什均衡 nà shén jūn héng
collusion/kəˈluːʒn/ 共谋 gòng móu
cartel/kɑːˈtel/ 卡特尔 kǎ tè ěr
price wars 价格战 jià gé zhàn
predatory pricing/ˈpredətəri ˈpraɪsɪŋ/ 掠夺性定价 lüè duó xìng dìng jià
non-price competition/nɒn praɪs ˌkɒmpəˈtɪʃn/ 非价格竞争 fēi jià gé jìng zhēng
monopoly/məˈnɒpəli/ 垄断 lǒng duàn
deadweight loss/ˈdedweɪt lɒs/ 无谓损失 wú wèi sǔn shī
natural monopoly/ˈnætʃərəl məˈnɒpəli/ 自然垄断 zì rán lǒng duàn
third-degree price discrimination/θɜːd dɪˈɡriː praɪs dɪˌskrɪmɪˈneɪʃn/ 三级价格歧视 sān jí jià gé qí shì
5.2

市场结构与可竞争性 (3.3.3)

English

A monopsony 买方垄断 is a single buyer facing many sellers, such as the only large employer in a town, or the UK's National Health Service as the main employer of nurses. A monopsony can push the price it pays below the competitive level. The firm gains from lower costs and higher profits; suppliers and workers lose from lower prices and wages, and fewer of them are hired. Consumers may gain if the cost savings are passed on in lower prices.

A market is contestable 可竞争的 when entry and exit are cheap, which means that sunk costs are low. Then a new firm can enter, take profits and leave ("hit-and-run" entry), so even a single incumbent must keep prices close to the competitive level, often by limit pricing. Air routes are fairly contestable: a low-cost airline can move an aircraft to a profitable route within weeks and move it away again if fares fall. Contestability benefits consumers through low prices, but firms that expect rivals to enter at any time may invest less in long-term quality.

Low sunk costs make entry and exit cheap, so the threat of hit-and-run entry keeps the incumbent's price near the competitive level through limit pricing; the cost is little commitment to long-term quality
Low sunk costs make hit-and-run entry possible, so the threat of entry keeps prices near the competitive level
词汇 训练
English 中文 拼音
monopsony/məˈnɒpsəni/ 买方垄断 mǎi fāng lǒng duàn
contestable 可竞争的 kě jìng zhēng de
5.1 5.2

企业、收入、成本与利润 (3.3.1-3.3.2)

English

Extract. In January 2022 Microsoft, which makes the Xbox games console, agreed to buy Activision Blizzard, the maker of Call of Duty, for about US$69 billion, the largest deal in the history of video games. Rival Sony argued that Microsoft could make popular games exclusive to Xbox. In April 2023 the UK's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) blocked the deal, mainly because Microsoft already had a large share of the young cloud-gaming market and could control access to Activision's games there. Microsoft offered 10-year agreements to keep Call of Duty on rival consoles, and sold the cloud-streaming rights to Activision's games outside Europe to the French firm Ubisoft for 15 years. The CMA approved the changed deal in October 2023.

A competitive firm with horizontal price at minimum average total cost and rising marginal cost
Long-run equilibrium in perfect competition: P = AR = MR = MC = minimum ATC. The firm's price comes from its market.

Table: shares of a games console market (%)

Firm Share
Firm A 45
Firm B 30
Firm C 20
Others 5

Questions

  • (a) Using the table, calculate the three-firm concentration ratio and identify the market structure it suggests. [2]
  • (b) Explain why Microsoft's purchase of Activision could be described as vertical integration. [4]
  • (c) With the help of a diagram, explain why less competition could lead to higher prices for consumers. [6]
  • (d) Examine two reasons why competition authorities investigate large mergers. [8]
  • (e) Evaluate whether the CMA was right to approve the changed deal. [12]

Model answers

(a) $CR_3 = 45 + 30 + 20 = 95\%$. Three firms supply nearly the whole market: a highly concentrated oligopoly.

(b) Vertical integration joins firms at different stages of the same production chain. Activision makes games (content), while Microsoft owns the platform on which games are sold and played (the Xbox and its cloud and subscription services). Buying a supplier of an input to its own platform is backward vertical integration. (It also has a horizontal element, because Microsoft already published games.)

(c) Use the monopoly diagram: a firm with market power faces a downward-sloping demand (AR) curve, with MR below it, and maximises profit where MR = MC. Compared with a competitive market, where price equals MC, output is lower and price higher, and there is a deadweight loss. If a merger lets Microsoft make key games exclusive, rivals' consoles become less attractive, Microsoft's demand becomes less elastic and its market power grows, so prices for consoles, games or subscriptions could rise.

(d) To protect consumers from higher prices and less choice: a merged firm with a large market share can raise prices, and if it controls an important input (a popular game) it can foreclose rivals. To protect innovation and future competition: in a new market such as cloud gaming, a dominant firm can stop new rivals from growing, so the market never becomes competitive. Evaluation: mergers can also bring benefits, such as economies of scale and more investment, so authorities must weigh these against the risks; it is hard to predict how young markets will develop.

(e) For approval: the remedies dealt with the main concern. Selling the cloud rights to Ubisoft meant Microsoft did not control access to Activision's games in cloud gaming, and the 10-year agreements kept Call of Duty on rival consoles. The merger may bring economies of scale, more investment in games and wider availability through subscription services. Other authorities (the EU) also approved the deal with remedies.

Against approval: behavioural remedies such as access agreements must be monitored and may be hard to enforce; they end after 10 or 15 years. The merger still increases concentration in game publishing, and Microsoft could favour its own platforms in subtle ways (timing, features). The deal may encourage other large technology firms to buy rivals, reducing competition over time.

Judgement: the CMA's decision was reasonable, because the remedy targeted the specific risk it had identified (control of cloud gaming) through a structural change (the rights sale) rather than only promises. But its success depends on how cloud gaming develops and whether the agreements are enforced; the authority should review the market before the agreements end.

What examiners reward: a correct concentration ratio with the market structure named, clear use of vertical or horizontal integration, a monopoly diagram used to explain the price effect, examined reasons with counter-points, and a judgement that uses the extract's remedies.

5.1 5.2

本课资料

English
  • Reports on Didi Chuxing's purchase of Uber China, August 2016 (Reuters, Financial Times).
  • European Commission, decision on the trucks cartel (19 July 2016).
  • UK Competition and Markets Authority, Microsoft/Activision Blizzard final reports (April and October 2023).
  • H. A. Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice", Quarterly Journal of Economics 69 (1955).
  • Pearson Edexcel International A Level Economics specification (WEC13), Issue 2, sections 3.3.1–3.3.3.
5.1 5.2

常见错误

English
  • Producing where MR = 0 when the question asks for profit maximisation. Profit is greatest where MR = MC.
  • Reading the monopoly price off the MC or MR curve. Go up from $Q_m$ to the demand (AR) curve.
  • Forgetting that normal profit is included in costs, so "zero economic profit" still means the owner earns a normal return.
  • Applying the long-run exit rule to the short run. In the short run a firm keeps trading while price covers AVC.
  • Saying monopolistic competition has barriers to entry. Entry is free; products are differentiated.
  • Writing that a concentration ratio proves collusion. It measures structure, not behaviour.
5.1 5.2

关键术语

English
  • MR = MC: the profit-maximising output rule.
  • Diminishing returns: in the short run, each extra unit of a variable factor adds less output.
  • Economies of scale: falling long-run average cost as output rises.
  • Allocative / productive efficiency: $P = MC$ / output at minimum ATC.
  • Concentration ratio: the combined market share of the largest $n$ firms.
  • Oligopoly: a few interdependent firms behind barriers to entry.
  • Natural monopoly: one firm supplies the market at the lowest average cost.
  • Contestable market: entry and exit are cheap because sunk costs are low.
5.1 5.2

自我检测

English
  1. Classify each: a smartphone maker buys a chip designer; a hotel chain buys a rival chain; a bank buys a football club.
  2. Explain why a firm might keep producing at a loss in the short run.
  3. Using the cost table, calculate ATC at $Q = 6$ and MC of the 8th unit.
  4. On the model, find the price and output that maximise revenue, and explain why they differ from the profit-maximising ones.
  5. Why did the Didi–Uber price war end in a merger? Use game theory.
  6. Explain why a natural monopoly is usually regulated instead of broken up.

Answers: 1. Backward vertical; horizontal; conglomerate. 2. If price covers average variable cost, each unit still pays something towards the fixed costs, which must be paid anyway; shutting down would make the loss bigger. 3. ATC $= (12 + 21)/6 = 5.5$; MC of the 8th unit $= 32 - 26 = 6$. 4. Revenue is greatest where MR = 0: $Q = 70$, $P = 35$. Profit is greatest where MR = MC: $Q = 40$, $P = 50$. Beyond $Q = 40$, each extra unit adds more to cost than to revenue. 5. Each firm cut prices because it feared losing customers if it did not (competing was the dominant strategy), so both made huge losses; merging ended the game and let the combined firm raise prices. 6. One network has the lowest average cost; splitting it would duplicate the fixed costs and raise average cost, so regulators cap its prices or profits instead.

附加说明 PDF
English
Supported transfer: Firms, costs, growth and competition

Scope and prerequisite teaching

Issue 2, June 2018. All four units have a complete lettered objective map; IAS and IA2 target teaching authored; qualification rubric certified from recent WEC11–WEC14 schemes.

This focused rehearsal adopts the linked native explanations; it does not replace them or certify a whole qualification. Supported objective IDs: 3.3.1.1a, 3.3.1.2a, 3.3.1.2b, 3.3.1.2c, 3.3.1.2d, 3.3.1.2e, 3.3.1.2f, 3.3.1.2g, 3.3.1.3a, 3.3.1.3b, 3.3.1.3c, 3.3.2.1a, 3.3.2.1b, 3.3.2.2a, 3.3.2.2b, 3.3.2.2c, 3.3.2.2d, 3.3.2.3a, 3.3.2.3b, 3.3.2.3c, 3.3.2.3d, 3.3.2.3e, 3.3.2.3f, 3.3.2.4a, 3.3.2.4b, 3.3.3.1a, 3.3.3.2a, 3.3.3.2b, 3.3.3.3a, 3.3.3.3b, 3.3.3.3c, 3.3.3.3d, 3.3.3.4a, 3.3.3.4b, 3.3.3.4c, 3.3.3.4d, 3.3.3.5a, 3.3.3.5b, 3.3.3.5c, 3.3.3.5d, 3.3.3.5e, 3.3.3.5f, 3.3.3.5g, 3.3.3.6a, 3.3.3.6b, 3.3.3.6c, 3.3.3.6d, 3.3.3.6e, 3.3.3.6f, 3.3.3.6g, 3.3.3.6h, 3.3.3.7a, 3.3.3.7b, 3.3.3.8a, 3.3.3.8b, 3.3.3.8c, 3.3.3.8d.

Native prerequisites: 0502, 0503, 0504, 0505, 0506, 0507, 0508, 0509, 0510, 0511, 0512, 0513, 0514, 0515, 0516, 0517, 0518, 0519, 0520.

Key terms

fixed cost 固定成本; variable cost 可变成本; average cost 平均成本; profit 利润; monopsony 买方垄断; contestable market 可竞争市场; sunk cost 沉没成本; limit pricing 限制性定价; predatory pricing 掠夺性定价.

Stacked bars of average cost: at Q = 10, AFC 6 plus AVC 14 gives ATC 20; at Q = 12, AFC 5 plus AVC 14 gives ATC 19.

Firms, costs, growth and competition

Total, average and marginal measures answer different questions. Profit=total revenue−total cost. Additional output is justified in a profit-maximizing model by incremental revenue and cost, subject to relevant conditions; higher sales do not guarantee higher profit. Size, ownership and integration affect finance, control, risk and coordination. Market power and contestability require evidence about alternatives and entry, not firm size alone.

Worked case

In an original short-run table, fixed cost is 60 currency units. At Q=10 items, variable cost is 140; at Q=12, variable cost is 168. Calculate costs and interpret the change.

TC=TFC+TVC; TC at 10=60+140=200 units. ATC=TC/Q; ATC at 10=200/10=20 units/item. At 12, TC=60+168=228 units and ATC=228/12=19 units/item. Interval MC=ΔTC/ΔQ=(228−200)/(12−10)=14 units/item. AVC=TVC/Q=140/10=168/12=14 units/item. AFC falls from 60/10=6 to 60/12=5 units/item, lowering ATC. These are table intervals, not a claim about a smooth derivative or all output levels. Productivity and profit need their own measures.

Independent transfer

A firm expands through acquisition and lowers unit costs but loses customers after quality problems. Evaluate growth rather than assuming economies of scale guarantee success.

Checked original model

Lower long-run average cost can improve competitiveness, but revenue depends on demand and quality. Acquisition can add finance, capacity and coordination risks; integration does not automatically improve management. Compare margins, quality, customer response, entry barriers and alternative organic growth. A small niche firm may rationally remain small. Supported IAL WEC13 targets in this topic are reused; the monopsony and contestability objectives below are taught in full, and the 3.3.4–3.3.5 and Unit 4 targets in the topic 6–8 supplements.

Monopsony: one dominant buyer

A monopsony is a market with a single buyer. Monopsony power 买方垄断力 exists whenever one buyer is large enough to influence the price it pays, even if smaller buyers exist. The conditions are: suppliers have no alternative buyer of similar size; sellers face barriers to reaching other customers (distance, contracts, product specificity); and in a labour market, workers face geographical or occupational immobility 不可流动性, so one employer dominates local hiring.

Original diagram: a monopsony employer hires where MRP = MCL and pays the wage on the supply curve.

In the labour-market model, the supply curve of labour is the firm's average cost of labour. Because the single employer must raise the wage for all workers to attract one more, the marginal cost of labour (MCL) lies above supply. A profit-maximising monopsonist hires where MRP = MCL (L$_m$), then pays the wage shown by the supply curve at that employment (W$_m$). Compared with a competitive outcome (L$_c$, W$_c$), employment and the wage are both lower. With supply W = 2 + 0.05L and MRP = 12 − 0.05L, the competitive outcome is L$_c$ = 100 workers at W$_c$ = 7 per hour; with MCL = 2 + 0.10L, the monopsonist hires L$_m$ ≈ 67 at W$_m$ ≈ 5.3 per hour.

Costs and benefits must be argued per group, then weighed. The monopsonist firm gains: lower input prices reduce marginal and average cost (MC$_1$→MC$_2$, AC$_1$→AC$_2$ on a standard cost–revenue diagram), raising supernormal profit; bulk buying can add purchasing economies of scale; and bargaining power lets it set terms on price, quality and delivery. Supplier firms lose: a lower price cuts revenue and profit, dependence on one customer is risky, and weak bargaining power can block investment — although a guaranteed, stable demand can help suppliers plan. Employees typically face a lower wage and lower employment than in a competitive labour market, and possibly poorer conditions; against this, a large secure employer can offer job security, and a socially responsible or non-profit-maximising buyer (many monopsony employers are governments) may pay fairly. Consumers may gain lower prices if the cost saving is passed on — but if the firm also has selling (monopoly) power it may keep the saving as profit, and squeezed suppliers may cut quality, reducing choice.

Evaluation hinges on conditions: the strength of buying power, whether suppliers can organise (cooperatives) or workers unionise, whether government restricts monopsony power, and the time horizon.

Contestable markets and limit pricing

A contestable market is one where entry and exit are easy and cheap. Characteristics: no significant barriers to entry or exit, low sunk costs (spending that cannot be recovered on exit, such as industry-specific equipment or advertising), access to the same technology as incumbents, and no fear of aggressive retaliation. The key idea is that potential competition 潜在竞争 disciplines incumbent firms: the threat of "hit-and-run" entry can force even a single seller to behave competitively.

Implications for behaviour: incumbents hold profits closer to normal and may choose limit pricing — setting the price below the short-run profit-maximising level, low enough that entry at an entrant's higher cost is unprofitable, yet still above the incumbent's own average cost.

Original diagram: the incumbent sacrifices some profit (P instead of P) to keep entry unprofitable.

With demand P = 20 − 0.05Q, marginal revenue P = 20 − 0.10Q and constant incumbent AC = MC = 8, the short-run profit maximum is MR = MC at Q = 120, P$_M$ = 14. If an entrant's minimum average cost is 11, a limit price of P$_L$ = 10 (selling Q = 200 where demand equals 10) keeps entry unprofitable while the incumbent still earns (10 − 8) × 200 = 400 per period. Limit pricing deters potential entrants; predatory pricing is different — pricing below average variable cost to drive existing rivals out, which is illegal in many jurisdictions.

Sunk costs are decisive because they decide whether the threat of entry is credible. With low sunk costs an entrant can enter, take profits, and exit at little loss, so incumbents must behave as if competition were real. High sunk costs make exit expensive, entry risky, and the market less contestable whatever the concentration ratio says.

Costs and benefits: consumers gain from prices held near competitive levels, wider choice and pressure for quality; firms face lower supernormal profit but a spur to efficiency (X-inefficiency falls). Evaluation: contestability is a spectrum, not a yes/no property; incumbents may raise barriers deliberately (advertising, capacity expansion); and governments can raise contestability directly — subsidies and low-cost loans for small firms, tax incentives, deregulation, privatisation, competitive tendering for public contracts and trade liberalisation — though each measure carries opportunity cost, takes time, and can misfire (privatisation may create a private monopoly; foreign entrants may force domestic firms out).

WEC13 assessment demand for this topic

Recent WEC13 papers assess these outcomes as 20-mark Section C essays (two chosen from three) and 1-mark Section A multiple choice. Each 20-mark essay is marked as 12 marks for knowledge, application and analysis (four levels: accurate precise knowledge, fully integrated context, and logical multi-stage chains of reasoning reach Level 4, 10–12) plus 8 marks for evaluation (three levels: recognised different viewpoints or critical use of evidence leading to an informed judgement reach Level 3, 7–8). The January 2025 scheme caps answers at Level 3 when no appropriate diagram is offered or when only one economic agent is discussed, and the January 2023 scheme caps at Level 3 when the answer never refers to a firm with monopsony power. Diagrams, both agent groups named in the question, and the given context are therefore requirements, not extras.

Evidence and assessment limits

The tasks and marking points here are original, not official questions or mark schemes. The WEC13 essay rubric and caps cited above are read from the January 2023 and January 2025 WEC13 mark schemes; the monopsony and contestability teaching is grounded in those papers and specification page 36 (PDF page 40). The 3.3.4–3.3.5 labour-market and intervention targets are taught in topic 6's supplement; the Unit 4 targets in topics 7 and 8.

该知识点的互动课程

逐步完成,配合即时检查练习。

更多 Pearson Edexcel · International A-Level · 经济学 知识点

登录或创建账户

IGCSE, A-Level & AP