| English | 释义 | 拼音 |
|---|---|---|
| cartel/kɑːˈtel/ | 卡特尔 | kǎ tè ěr |
| interdependence/ˌɪntədɪˈpendəns/ | 相互依赖 | xiāng hù yī lài |
| game theory/ɡeɪm ˈθɪəri/ | 博弈论 | bó yì lùn |
| dominant strategy/ˈdɒmɪnənt ˈstrætədʒi/ | 占优策略 | zhàn yōu cè lüè |
| Nash equilibrium/næʃ ˌiːkwɪˈlɪbrɪəm/ | 纳什均衡 | nà shén jūn héng |
| price leadership/praɪs ˈliːdəʃɪp/ | 价格领导 | jià gé lǐng dǎo |
A cartel that fixed lorry prices
- In 2016 the European Commission fined five lorry makers — including Daimler, Volvo and DAF — almost €3 billion. For 14 years they had agreed prices with each other.
- Why would rivals cooperate in secret — and why do such agreements often break down?
- Each firm's profit depends on what its rivals do — interdependence 相互依赖. Game theory 博弈论 helps to explain such choices.
A pricing game
- Two firms, A and B, each choose a High or Low price. The payoff matrix shows profits (A, B):
- Both High: (8, 8). A Low, B High: (12, 2). A High, B Low: (2, 12). Both Low: (4, 4).
Worked example: finding the outcome
Think as firm A, holding B's choice fixed.
- If B chooses High: A earns 8 from High, 12 from Low — Low is better.
- If B chooses Low: A earns 2 from High, 4 from Low — Low is better again.
- Low is A's dominant strategy 占优策略; B's is the same. Both choose Low and earn 4 each: a Nash equilibrium 纳什均衡, where neither can gain by changing alone.

最佳反应与稳定结果
固定对手的选择,比较一家企业自己的收益。联合利润较高的结果未必能抵御单方改变策略。
Payoffs (A, B): both High (10, 10); A Low B High (14, 3); A High B Low (3, 14); both Low (5, 5). If B chooses High, what should A choose?
难度 1/5 · 今日首次完成可获 100 金币及少量额外奖励
14 is more than 10.
In that game, Low is a dominant strategy for A.
难度 1/5 · 今日首次完成可获 100 金币及少量额外奖励
Low is better whether B chooses High (14 > 10) or Low (5 > 3).
In that game, what is the combined profit at the Nash equilibrium?
难度 2/5 · 今日首次完成可获 140 金币及少量额外奖励
Both choose Low and earn 5 each.
Why firms collude
- Both would earn 8 if both chose High. So firms have an incentive to agree to keep prices high.
- A formal agreement is a cartel 卡特尔, like OPEC for oil producers. Without a written deal, firms may follow a price leader — price leadership 价格领导 — or simply avoid price cuts (tacit collusion).
Match each term to its meaning.
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Collusion can be formal or informal.
Why collusion breaks down
- Each firm can earn 12 by secretly cutting its price while the other keeps it high: the incentive to cheat.
- It is harder with many firms, different costs, falling demand, or buyers who can switch easily. Competition authorities can fine cartels heavily, and members who confess first often escape fines.
Which make collusion LESS likely to last?
难度 2/5 · 今日首次完成可获 140 金币及少量额外奖励
High barriers make collusion easier to keep.
Why do cartel members have an incentive to cheat?
难度 1/5 · 今日首次完成可获 100 金币及少量额外奖励
The cheat wins customers at a price still above cost.
The Nash equilibrium is not the outcome with the largest combined profit. Both High gives 16 in total, but it is not stable: each firm can gain by switching to Low alone. That is the difference between what is best for the group and what is best for each player.
Oligopolists are interdependent, so game theory compares each firm's payoffs for each choice of its rival. A dominant strategy can lead both firms to a Nash equilibrium with low profits. Collusion — cartels, price leadership or tacit agreement — tries to escape it but faces cheating and the law.
Using game theory, explain why two firms might both set low prices even though both would earn more with high prices.
The individual incentive differs from the group's interest.