Why it matters. On 12 January 2013 the air monitor at the US Embassy in Beijing recorded fine-particle (PM2.5) pollution of 886 micrograms per cubic metre, more than thirty times the level the World Health Organization then called safe. Schools kept children indoors and hospitals filled with breathing problems. Every factory, power station and car that added to the smog made its own decision rationally: it paid for its coal and fuel, but not for the damage to millions of lungs. The market price of electricity and steel left out a cost. In September 2013 the State Council published its Air Pollution Action Plan, with coal limits, factory closures and stricter car rules, and by 2017 Beijing's average PM2.5 had fallen by about a third. This unit asks why free markets get some things wrong, and when the government makes them better — or worse.
In this unit you will:
define market failure and name its sources;
analyse external costs and benefits on a diagram and measure the welfare loss;
explain public goods, information gaps, moral hazard and bubbles with real cases;
compare the main methods of government intervention;
explain government failure and weigh a policy against it.
2.1
市场失灵 (1.3.5)
English
Market failure 市场失灵 happens when a free market produces or consumes too much or too little of a good compared with the socially optimal 社会最优的 level. The price mechanism works well when prices include every cost and benefit. It fails when they do not.
There are five main sources:
externalities 外部性: costs or benefits that fall on people outside the deal;
public goods 公共物品 and the free-rider problem 搭便车问题;
Private costs and benefits are those paid or enjoyed by the buyer or seller. An external cost 外部成本 or external benefit 外部收益 falls on a third party. Adding them gives the social total:
Externalities can come from production or consumption:
external cost of production: a coal power station's smoke;
external benefit of production: a firm trains engineers who later work for other firms;
external cost of consumption: driving in rush hour slows every other road user;
external benefit of consumption: a vaccinated child cannot pass measles to a baby too young to be vaccinated. Measles needs about 95% of people to be immune before outbreaks stop.
Each extra driver slows everyone else: an external cost of consumption that the driver does not pay
On a diagram we use marginal 边际 curves. The market trades where marginal private benefit (MPB, the demand curve) equals marginal private cost (MPC, the supply curve). The social optimum is where marginal social benefit (MSB) equals marginal social cost (MSC).
We continue the model market from Unit 1, now written with price on the left: MPB is $P = 70 - Q/2$ and MPC is $P = Q/4 - 5$, so the market settles at $Q = 100$, $P = 20$.
Worked example: a negative production externality.
Each unit causes an external cost of 6 yuan, so $MSC = MPC + 6$.
Social optimum: $70 - Q/2 = Q/4 + 1$, so $\tfrac34 Q = 69$ and $Q^* = 92$.
The market makes 100: it over-produces by 8 units.
On each of those 8 units, social cost is above social benefit. The gap is 6 at $Q = 100$ and 0 at $Q = 92$, so the welfare loss 福利损失 is a triangle: $\tfrac12 \times 8 \times 6 = 24$ yuan per day.
With a positive consumption externality of 6, $MSB = MPB + 6$ meets MPC at $Q^* = 108$. The market under-consumes by 8, and the welfare that could be gained is again $\tfrac12 \times 8 \times 6 = 24$.
External cost: the market makes 100 where MPB = MPC; society wants 92 where MSB = MSC; the triangle between them is the welfare loss of 24External benefit: the market stops at 100, but MSB = MSC at 108; the missing triangle is a welfare gain of 24
The specification asks for five contexts:
transport: congestion and exhaust;
health: vaccination, passive smoking;
education: a skilled workforce helps other firms and lowers crime;
environment: emissions, plastic waste;
finance: one bank's collapse can spread to others, as Lehman Brothers' failure did in September 2008.
A private good 私人物品 is rival 竞争性的 (if I eat the apple, you cannot) and excludable 排他性的 (the shop can stop non-payers). A public good is non-rival and non-excludable: a flood defence protects every house behind it at once, and nobody behind it can be left out.
That creates the free-rider problem: if you will be protected anyway, why pay? A private firm cannot charge enough to cover its costs, so a pure public good is not provided by the market at all. National defence, street lighting and flood barriers are usually paid for from taxes.
A lighthouse protects every passing ship at once, and no ship can be stopped from seeing it
The lighthouse is the textbook example, but in 1974 Ronald Coase showed that many British lighthouses had been built privately and paid for by fees collected at ports. When a public good's users can be charged in some other way, the market can sometimes provide it.
Goods sorted by rivalry and excludability: only the non-rival, non-excludable corner suffers from free-riding
Asymmetric information 信息不对称 means one side of a deal knows more than the other. In 1970 George Akerlof explained the "market for lemons": the seller of a used car knows whether it is a "lemon" (a bad car), but the buyer does not, so buyers offer only an average price and owners of good cars leave the market. The specification names four areas:
healthcare: patients cannot judge which treatment they need;
education: students cannot see a course's quality before they pay;
pensions: products are complex and their costs are hidden;
insurance: people who know they are high risk buy more cover.
The 2008 melamine milk scandal in China showed how dangerous such gaps can be. Some suppliers added melamine to watered-down milk to fake a high protein reading. Parents could not test the formula they bought; about 300,000 babies became ill and six died.
Moral hazard happens after a contract, when a protected person takes more risk because someone else will pay. A driver with full insurance may park carelessly. Banks that expect a government rescue may lend recklessly: in 2008 governments in the USA and Britain spent hundreds of billions of dollars rescuing banks, and taxpayers carried the risk the banks had taken.
A bubble forms when people buy an asset only because they expect to sell it at a higher price. Prices rise far above what the asset's earnings justify, then crash. Japan's Nikkei share index peaked at 38,916 on 29 December 1989, then fell by over 60% in less than three years; it did not return to its 1989 peak until February 2024. Land prices in Tokyo fell even further. A burst bubble hurts:
consumers: homes worth less than their mortgages (negative equity 负资产), smaller pensions;
producers: demand collapses;
workers: unemployment;
governments: recession, lower tax revenue and bank rescues.
The government intervenes to move output towards the social optimum. The main methods are:
Indirect taxes. A Pigouvian tax 庇古税, named after the economist Arthur Pigou (1920), equals the marginal external cost. On our model, a tax of 6 per unit moves supply up to MSC, and output falls to the social optimum of 92 at a consumer price of 24 — the same numbers as the tax in Unit 1.
Subsidies. A subsidy of 6 per unit corrects the positive externality: output rises to 108, buyers pay 16 and sellers receive 22. China's free childhood vaccinations under the national immunisation programme work the same way, with the price cut to zero.
Maximum prices 最高价格, set below equilibrium to keep a good affordable.
Minimum prices 最低价格, set above equilibrium to protect producers.
Tradeable pollution permits 可交易污染许可证.
Property rights 产权: if a river's owner can sue the factory that pollutes it, the factory must take the cost into account.
State provision of public goods and merit goods such as schooling.
Regulation 监管: bans, standards and limits.
Information: food labels, school league tables, health warnings.
Worked example: price controls on the model.
Maximum price of 16 yuan: $Q_d = 140 - 2(16) = 108$ and $Q_s = 20 + 4(16) = 84$. There is a shortage of 24. Queues, waiting lists and black markets follow. Rent controls show the effect: in Stockholm, which caps rents, people wait years in the city's official queue for a flat.
Minimum price of 24 yuan: $Q_s = 116$ and $Q_d = 92$. There is a surplus of 24, which the government may have to buy and store. Since 2004 China has set minimum purchase prices for rice, and since 2006 for wheat; the state grain company Sinograin buys the surplus when market prices fall below them. In the 1980s the European Union's guaranteed farm prices filled government stores with "butter mountains" and "wine lakes".
A maximum price of 16 causes a shortage of 24; a minimum price of 24 causes a surplus of 24
Tradeable permits combine regulation with the market. The government sets a cap on total emissions and issues that many permits. Firms that can cut pollution cheaply do so and sell their spare permits; firms for which cutting is expensive buy them. The cap fixes the pollution; the market finds the cheapest way to reach it. In our model the cap is 84 permits, and demand sets the permit price at 28. The European Union's Emissions Trading System began in 2005. China's national carbon market began trading in July 2021; it covers the power sector and about 4.5 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide a year, the largest market in the world by emissions covered.
The cap fixes 84 permits; firms' demand for permits sets their price at 28
The specification's contexts are health, housing, education, transport, environment, energy, agriculture and commodities. In an exam, always link the method to the failure: a tax for an external cost, a subsidy for an external benefit, state provision for a public good, information for an information gap.
Government failure 政府失灵 happens when intervention makes society worse off overall: the cure costs more than the disease. There are five main causes.
Information gaps: the government cannot measure the external cost exactly. If it sets the tax too high, it cuts output below the social optimum and creates a new welfare loss.
Unintended consequences: in 1989 Mexico City banned each car from driving on one weekday, chosen by its number plate. Many families bought a second, older and dirtier car, and later studies found no improvement in air quality.
Administrative costs: collecting taxes, enforcing rules and storing surpluses all use resources.
Lack of incentives: state providers that face no competition may have little reason to cut costs or improve quality.
Moral hazard: guaranteed prices or expected rescues change behaviour.
China's winter of 2017 shows several causes at once. To clean the air, local governments in Hebei and nearby provinces ordered millions of homes to switch from coal to gas heating. Gas supply could not keep up, and in December some homes and schools had no heating at all, until the government allowed coal to be burned again in areas not yet connected. The goal was right; the information and timing were not.
Five routes to government failure, all leading to a net welfare loss
Every answer about intervention should end by weighing the correction against these risks.
Extract. In February 2003 London introduced a congestion charge: drivers paid £5 a day to drive into central London on weekdays. In the first year traffic entering the zone fell by about 18% and delays fell by about 30%. Bus services improved, as buses were no longer stuck in traffic. The charge rose in steps and has been £15 since June 2020. Transport for London spends the revenue on public transport. Critics argue that a flat charge takes a larger share of a low income, that some small shops inside the zone lost customers, and that congestion later returned as roadworks and delivery vans increased. In January 2025 New York City became the first US city to introduce a similar charge.
Private choice gives 40 journeys. Including the external harm gives 30. A 20-pound charge raises private marginal journey cost and reaches 30 in this model; the charge is a transfer, not an extra 20 pounds of real resource cost per journey.
Questions
(a) Explain, using the extract, why road congestion is an example of a negative externality. [4]
(b) Before the charge, 100,000 vehicles a day entered the zone. Using the extract, calculate the number entering after the first year, and the daily revenue at £5. [4]
(c) With the help of a diagram, explain how a congestion charge could move the market towards the socially optimal level of road use. [6]
(d) Examine two problems a government faces in setting the right level of a congestion charge. [8]
(e) Evaluate whether road pricing is a better solution to congestion than building more roads. [12]
Model answers
(a) Each driver who enters a busy road slows down every other road user: buses, delivery vans and other drivers lose time and burn more fuel, and pedestrians breathe more polluted air. These are costs to third parties that the driver does not pay. So the marginal social cost of a journey is greater than its marginal private cost, and, without a charge, too many journeys are made at busy times. The extract's 30% fall in delays when traffic fell shows how large these external costs were.
(b) Vehicles after the charge $= 100{,}000 \times (1 - 0.18) = 82{,}000$ a day. Revenue $= 82{,}000 \times £5 = £410{,}000$ a day (ignoring exemptions and discounts).
(c) Use the negative-externality diagram above: the market for journeys settles where MPB = MPC, at a quantity above the social optimum where MSB = MSC. A charge equal to the marginal external cost at the optimum adds to the private cost of each journey, shifting MPC up to MSC. Drivers whose journeys are worth less than the full cost switch to buses, travel at other times or stay away, so the quantity falls to the social optimum and the welfare loss triangle is removed. The 18% fall in traffic is this movement.
(d) Measuring the external cost is hard. The cost of congestion depends on time of day, place and weather, and the value of time lost differs between people. A flat £15 charge will be too high at quiet times and too low at peak times, so it cannot match MSC everywhere. Demand responses change over time. Demand for car journeys into a city centre may be price inelastic for those with no alternative, so a charge reduces traffic less than expected; over time, the effect can wear off as incomes rise and as other causes, such as roadworks and delivery vans, add to congestion (as the extract notes). Evaluation: technology such as number-plate cameras allows charges to vary by time, which reduces the first problem; regular review of the charge reduces the second.
(e) For road pricing: it tackles the cause of the externality by making drivers pay the external cost, so the space on roads goes to journeys valued most. It raises revenue (about £410,000 a day in the example) that can fund buses and rail, giving people alternatives. It worked quickly in London: traffic fell 18% and delays 30% in a year.
For building roads: new roads add capacity without charging drivers, so they are popular and do not hurt low-income drivers. In growing cities with little road space, more capacity may be needed.
Against building roads: new roads often fill up with new traffic (induced demand) because lower congestion makes driving cheaper in time, so congestion returns. Roads are very costly, take years to build, use scarce land and raise pollution, an external cost of their own.
Against road pricing: a flat charge is regressive, and some city-centre businesses lose trade. Setting the right charge is hard (part d), and enforcement and cameras cost money. Its effect may fade without regular increases.
Judgement: road pricing is usually the better policy in dense city centres, where there is no space for new roads and public transport is a real alternative, because it targets the externality and funds alternatives. Its success depends on charges that vary with congestion and on reinvesting revenue in public transport; building roads may still be needed between cities, where road pricing is harder to apply and alternatives are fewer.
What examiners reward: the externality explained with the extract's evidence, calculations with clear working, a labelled MSC/MPC diagram used in the explanation, problems that are examined (with a counter-point), and a judgement that depends on clear conditions.
2.1 2.2
本课资料
English
US Embassy Beijing air-quality readings, January 2013; State Council, Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan (September 2013).
G. Akerlof, "The Market for 'Lemons'", Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (1970).
R. Coase, "The Lighthouse in Economics", Journal of Law and Economics 17 (1974).
L. Davis, "The Effect of Driving Restrictions on Air Quality in Mexico City", Journal of Political Economy 116 (2008).
Transport for London, congestion charge monitoring reports.
Pearson Edexcel International AS Economics specification (WEC11), Issue 2, sections 1.3.5–1.3.6.
2.1 2.2
常见错误
English
Drawing the external cost as a shift of demand. A production externality makes MSC lie above MPC; demand (MPB) does not move.
Shading the wrong triangle. The welfare loss lies between MSC and MSB, from the social optimum to the market output.
Calling anything the government provides a "public good". Schools and hospitals are rival and excludable: they are merit goods or state-provided private goods.
Confusing moral hazard (behaviour changes after the deal) with asymmetric information before it.
Saying a maximum price is set above equilibrium. A maximum price only has an effect when it is below equilibrium; a minimum price only when it is above.
Ending an intervention answer without evaluation. Name a cause of government failure that could apply.
2.1 2.2
关键术语
English
Market failure: too much or too little of a good compared with the social optimum.
Externality: a cost or benefit to a third party, outside the market price.
Public good: non-rival and non-excludable, so free-riding stops private provision.
Asymmetric information: one side of a deal knows more than the other.
Moral hazard: taking more risk because someone else bears the cost.
Government failure: intervention that causes a net welfare loss.
2.1 2.2
自我检测
English
Explain why the smog in Beijing in January 2013 was a market failure.
On the model, with an external cost of 6 per unit, why is the welfare loss 24?
Is a toll motorway a public good? Use rivalry and excludability.
Explain why a used-car market may shrink when buyers cannot check quality.
On the model, a maximum price of 18 yuan is set. Calculate the shortage.
Using the Mexico City driving ban, explain one cause of government failure.
Answers: 1. Factories, power stations and drivers paid for their fuel but not for the damage their smoke did to other people's health, so social cost was above private cost and too much was produced and burned. 2. The market produces 100 but the optimum is 92; on those 8 extra units the gap between MSC and MSB grows from 0 to 6, so the loss is $\tfrac12 \times 8 \times 6 = 24$. 3. No: it is excludable (drivers who do not pay are stopped at the barrier) and rival when busy (extra cars slow everyone). 4. Buyers pay only an average price because they might get a lemon; owners of good cars will not sell at that price and leave, so the cars on offer get worse and the market shrinks. 5. $Q_d = 140 - 36 = 104$, $Q_s = 20 + 72 = 92$: a shortage of 12 per day. 6. Unintended consequences: families bought a second, older car to drive on their banned day, so traffic and pollution did not fall.
Supported transfer: Elasticity, welfare and policy
Scope and prerequisite teaching
Issue 2, June 2018. All four units have a complete lettered objective map; IAS and IA2 target teaching authored; qualification rubric certified from recent WEC11–WEC14 schemes.
This focused rehearsal adopts the linked native explanations; it does not replace them or certify a whole qualification. Supported objective IDs: 1.3.5.1a, 1.3.5.1b, 1.3.5.2a, 1.3.5.2b, 1.3.5.2c, 1.3.5.2d, 1.3.5.2e, 1.3.5.3a, 1.3.5.3b, 1.3.5.4a, 1.3.5.4b, 1.3.5.4c, 1.3.5.5a, 1.3.5.5b, 1.3.5.6a, 1.3.5.6b, 1.3.6.1a, 1.3.6.1b, 1.3.6.1c, 1.3.6.2a, 1.3.6.2b.
Percentage changes need a stated convention. PED uses quantity demanded and own price on the same demand relation; PES uses quantity supplied. YED and cross-price elasticity compare different determinants. A unit tax creates a price wedge; relative responsiveness shapes burden. An externality concerns third-party costs/benefits, not merely an expensive transaction. Public goods and information failure have different mechanisms.
Worked case
An original market's pre-tax price is 10. After a unit tax, consumers pay 12 and producers receive 9. Calculate the wedge and burden, then qualify a welfare claim.
Tax per item=consumer price−producer receipt=12−9=3 currency units/item. Consumer burden=12−10=2 units/item; producer burden=10−9=1 unit/item. The stated burden split concerns this equilibrium, not a universal tax rule. Tax revenue=tax per item×post-tax quantity; that quantity must be known. Revenue is a transfer, while welfare effects require changes in surplus, resource use and any external harm. A corrective tax can reduce inefficient overproduction, but only with the relevant external-cost model and evidence. Collection cost, evasion and access matter.
Independent transfer
A subsidy expands a product with an unpriced external cost. Is greater output necessarily a welfare gain? Compare a better-targeted policy.
Checked original model
Greater output can increase external harm even if consumers and producers gain privately. Identify marginal social/private costs and the efficient versus market quantity before judging. A targeted charge or standard may address the harm more directly, subject to measurement, enforcement and distribution. A subsidy for a cleaner alternative might help through a different mechanism; its fiscal and behavioural effects still need evaluation. IGCSE pupils use the supported private/external/social distinction; detailed marginal welfare geometry belongs only where the course's mapped outcomes authorize it.
Evidence and assessment limits
The tasks and marking points here are original, not official questions or mark schemes. The essay rubric follows the actual WEC11–WEC14 schemes (20-mark essays: 12 KAA + 8 evaluation, with Level-3 caps for missing diagram or context).