IB Diploma Programme Economics HL, Unit 2 Microeconomics (first assessment
2022). This topic covers syllabus sections 2.10 (market failure —
asymmetric information) and 2.11 (market failure — market power) in full.
The monopoly model reuses the shared curves — demand (average revenue) $P = 70 - Q/2$, marginal revenue $P = 70 - Q$, marginal cost $P = 10 + Q/2$ — with the profit-maximising output 40 at price 50, so every number
cross-checks against the earlier drives.
Must-know for this topic:
Family
Relationship
information
asymmetric = one side knows more; adverse selection (before) and moral hazard (after)
monopoly
MR $=$ MC at $Q = 40$; price 50 on AR; with ATC 30, supernormal profit $(50 - 30) \times 40 = 800$
welfare
against the competitive $(60, 40)$: deadweight loss $\tfrac12 \times 20 \times 20 = 200$
natural monopoly
falling ATC over the whole market — regulate, do not fragment
concentration
$n$-firm ratio: shares $40+25+15+10$ give CR4 $= 90\%$
4.2
Asymmetric information
Asymmetric information 信息不对称 (2.10) means one party to a transaction
knows more than the other — the used-car seller knows the car, the borrower
knows the repayment odds, the insured knows the risk. Two failure
mechanisms: adverse selection 逆向选择 BEFORE the contract (the informed side
self-selects badly — only lemmings get offered, only high-risks buy
insurance at a pooled price), and moral hazard 道德风险 AFTER the contract (the
protected side takes more risk — insured drivers drive less carefully,
bailed banks lend recklessly). The market fails because mutually
beneficial trades vanish: quality sellers cannot credibly signal, so prices
average down and good products exit — the market for lemons. Responses:
signalling (warranties, brands, credentials), screening (excesses,
deductibles, credit checks), disclosure regulation, and state provision of
information. Information gaps join the Unit-1 critique of rational choice:
framed, partially-informed agents are the norm the policy must handle.
Market power 市场力量 (2.11) is the ability of a firm to influence price —
culminating in MONOPOLY: one seller, a unique product, high barriers to entry 进入壁垒 (legal, patents, branding, control of resources, economies of scale)
keeping entrants out, so the monopolist is a PRICE-MAKER. The monopoly
model: profit maximisation where MR $=$ MC — $70 - Q = 10 + Q/2$ gives
$60 = 1.5Q$, so $Q_m = 40$; the price read from the demand curve is $P_m = 50$; with ATC $= 30$ at that output, supernormal profit $= (50 - 30) \times 40 = 800$ per day, sustained by the barriers.
The welfare case: the competitive benchmark ($P = MC$) sits at $(60, 40)$ —
so the monopolist produces 20 FEWER units at a price 10 HIGHER. The
deadweight loss 无谓损失 is the triangle between demand and MC over the lost output:
$\tfrac12 \times 20 \times 20 = 200$ per day, plus a transfer from
consumers (higher price) to the firm. Monopoly may also bring X-inefficiency
(costs drifting above the achievable floor for lack of pressure) — though
economies of scale and dynamic innovation are the standard defences, and
Schumpeter's case is that big profits fund the next technology.
A natural monopoly 自然垄断 has falling average costs over the whole
market demand (one network is cheapest — rails, water mains): fragmenting
it would RAISE costs, so the response is regulation — price capping at
$P = MC$ or average-cost pricing — or state ownership, trading profit
against coverage.
Oligopoly and collusion (also 2.11's scope in IB's treatment of market
power): a few interdependent firms behind barriers may collude towards the
monopoly outcome (cartels) or compete (price wars); regulation polices
cartels. The concentration ratio 集中度 measures structure: with market shares 40,
25, 15, 10 and 10 percent, the four-firm ratio is $40 + 25 + 15 + 10 = 90\%$ — a concentrated market, though the ratio misses foreign competition
and contestability. Policy responses to market power: competition law
(merger control, abuse-of-dominance cases), regulation of natural
monopolies, and deregulation where contestability disciplines incumbents.
Asymmetric information definition; adverse selection vs moral hazard (before vs after the contract); the lemons market where good products exit; signalling, screening, disclosure (2.10).
Market power and monopoly assumptions; the five barriers to entry; price-maker behaviour (2.11).
The model: MR = MC at $Q = 40$, price 50, profit $(50-30) \times 40 = 800$; competitive benchmark $(60, 40)$; deadweight loss 200 (2.11).
X-inefficiency; the economies-of-scale and dynamic-efficiency defences; the Schumpeter case (2.11).
Natural monopoly: falling ATC over the market; regulate price at MC or average cost rather than fragment (2.11); oligopoly and collusion — interdependence, cartels, price wars; CR4 = 90% with its limits; competition law, regulation, deregulation.
Supported preparation: HL market power and information
Scope and prerequisites
IB economics first assessment 2022. Three supervised news commentaries cover microeconomics, macroeconomics and the global economy through distinct key concepts. School checks source recency and commentary requirements against the full guide.
Mapped preparation outcomes: ib_economics_hl.4.1, ib_economics_hl.4.2. Read the matching native lesson first. Actual approved choices, evidence and final learner work remain separate.
Source vocabulary
adverse selection 逆向选择; moral hazard 道德风险.
Explanation and worked method
Asymmetric information means one party knows relevant facts the other lacks. Market power can restrict output and increase price relative to competitive conditions, but comparison requires assumptions and cost evidence. Intervention may improve information or competition while creating administrative costs or unintended responses.
Task: customers cannot judge repair quality before purchase; one local provider charges high prices. Compare an inspection disclosure rule with a price ceiling.
Verified disclosure directly addresses information quality but needs trustworthy inspection. A binding ceiling may improve affordability for available services yet reduce supply or quality if below viable cost. Identify the demand/supply or cost/revenue diagram appropriate to the claim; label price, quantity and assumptions. Do not infer exploitation from price alone.
Independent transfer
A high-price repair firm claims unusually high costs. What evidence would distinguish this from market power?
Attempt independently before reading the model.
Checked original model
Compare relevant costs, prices, profits, quality, entry barriers and customer alternatives over compatible periods. High price alone cannot separate high cost from restricted competition. Use the resulting model to choose information or competition intervention and consider its costs.
These are authored formative expectations, not official IB descriptors. Accept other justified arguments with evidence and material limits.
Source and task holds
This supplement teaches the method for this part of the course. The full assessment criteria and any texts your school chooses come from your teacher.
Interactive lessons on this topic
Work through it step by step, with instant-check exercises.