Why it matters. On 1 April 1992 the US state of New Jersey raised its minimum wage from 4.25 to 5.05 an hour, while neighbouring Pennsylvania kept $4.25.…
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6.1
Labour markets and government intervention
Why it matters. On 1 April 1992 the US state of New Jersey raised its minimum wage from $4.25 to$5.05 an hour, while neighbouring Pennsylvania kept $4.25. Textbook theory predicted that New Jersey's fast-food restaurants would hire fewer workers. Two economists, David Card and Alan Krueger, phoned 410 restaurants on both sides of the border before and after the rise. Employment in New Jersey did not fall; if anything it rose slightly compared with Pennsylvania. Their 1994 paper started a long debate about how labour markets really work, and in 2021 Card shared the Nobel Prize in economics. One explanation is that many employers have some power over the wages they pay. This unit explains how wages are set, why labour markets fail, and what governments do about it in labour and product markets.
In this unit you will:
explain the demand for labour as a derived demand and the factors behind labour supply;
find the competitive wage and analyse shifts in demand and supply;
explain geographical and occupational immobility;
evaluate how governments control monopolies, promote competition and protect suppliers and workers;
analyse minimum and maximum wages and other labour-market policies.
6.1
The demand for and supply of labour
Firms do not want workers for their own sake; they want what workers produce. The demand for labour is a derived demand 派生需求: it comes from the demand for the product. When air travel collapsed in 2020, airlines stopped hiring pilots; when it recovered in 2022–2023, pilots were in short supply.
The demand for labour depends on:
the demand for the final product;
labour productivity 生产率: how much each worker adds;
the price of the product;
the wage compared with the cost of capital that could replace workers.
The elasticity of demand for labour 劳动需求弹性 is higher when demand for the product is elastic, when wages are a large share of total costs, when machines can easily replace workers, and over a longer time period.
The supply of labour to an occupation depends on:
the size and age structure of the population: China's working-age population (15–59) has been shrinking since about 2012;
net migration;
income tax rates and the level of welfare benefits;
government rules, such as licences and working-time limits;
trade unions 工会, which can limit entry or bargain for higher pay.
The elasticity of labour supply 劳动供给弹性 is low when an occupation needs long training (surgeons, airline pilots) and higher over a longer time period, and when workers can move easily between jobs and places.
A garment factory: firms hire workers for what they produce, so the demand for labour is derived from demand for clothes
elasticity of demand for labour/ɪlæˈstɪsɪti ɒv dɪˈmænd fɔː ˈleɪbə/
trade unions/treɪd ˈjuːnɪənz/
elasticity of labour supply
6.1
Wage determination and labour market failure
In a competitive labour market, the wage is set where the supply of labour meets the demand for labour.
Worked example: the competitive wage.
Supply of labour: $W = 4 + 0.02L$. Demand for labour: $W = 16 - 0.04L$ (wage in yuan per hour, $L$ in workers).
Set them equal: $4 + 0.02L = 16 - 0.04L$, so $0.06L = 12$ and $L = 200$ workers.
The wage is $W = 4 + 0.02(200) = 8$ yuan per hour.
Any shift moves the equilibrium. A rise in demand for the product shifts labour demand right: wages and employment both rise. More migration or lower benefits shift labour supply right: employment rises and the wage falls.
Labour supply W = 4 + 0.02L meets labour demand W = 16 − 0.04L at 200 workers and 8 yuan per hour
In the public sector 公共部门, wages are often set by negotiation and government budgets rather than by the market. In England, teachers' pay is recommended each year by an independent review body and then set by the government. Public-sector pay can therefore end up above or below the level that would clear the market, causing either long queues of applicants or unfilled jobs.
Labour markets fail when workers cannot move to where the jobs are.
Geographical immobility 地域流动性不足: workers cannot move to another area. High housing costs, family ties and lack of information all play a part. In China the hukou (household registration) system has long made it harder for migrant workers to get schooling and healthcare for their children in the cities where they work.
Occupational immobility 职业流动性不足: workers cannot move to another job because they lack the skills, cannot afford retraining, or face discrimination. A laid-off coal miner in Shanxi cannot become a software engineer next month.
Both kinds leave unemployment in one place or occupation beside unfilled vacancies in another.
Governments intervene in product markets because of market power (monopoly and monopsony), externalities, information gaps and fairness.
To control monopolies and mergers, governments use:
price regulation: under an RPI − X price cap, a firm may raise prices by inflation (RPI) minus X percent each year. When British Telecom was privatised in 1984, its prices were capped at RPI − 3%. To keep its profits, the firm must cut costs by at least X percent a year;
profit regulation;
quality standards and performance targets;
referral to a competition authority and laws to control mergers. In April 2021 China's market regulator, SAMR, fined Alibaba ¥18.2 billion for forcing merchants to sell only on its platform.
With RPI at 3%, an RPI − X cap with X = 2 allows prices to rise only 1% a year, so the firm must cut costs to keep its profits
To promote competition and contestability, governments use:
tax incentives and grants for small firms and for foreign direct investment;
deregulation;
privatisation 私有化;
competitive tendering 竞争性招标: private firms bid to run public services such as bus routes or hospital cleaning;
To protect suppliers and employees, governments use:
rules on local sourcing;
employment laws against exploitation;
limits on foreign firms entering a market;
limits on the power of large buyers (monopsony);
nationalisation 国有化: in February 2008 the UK government took over the failing bank Northern Rock.
Every measure should be judged by its effect on five things: price, profit, efficiency, quality and choice.
Intervention has limits:
regulatory capture 监管俘获: the regulator comes to serve the firms it regulates. After the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, investigators found that the US offshore drilling regulator had grown too close to the oil companies;
asymmetric information: the firm knows its true costs better than the regulator does;
too few staff or too little money for the regulator;
Governments intervene in labour markets because of monopsony employers paying low wages, in-work poverty, immobility, discrimination and exploitation. Their tools include:
maximum wages 最高工资: rare, but public-sector pay caps are one example (the UK capped most public-sector pay rises at 1% a year from 2013 to 2017), and since 2014 EU rules have limited bankers' bonuses to the size of their salary, or twice it with shareholders' approval;
minimum wages 最低工资: China's provinces set their own minimum wages; Shanghai's, the highest, was ¥2,690 a month from July 2023;
taxes on employment, such as employers' social insurance contributions and corporation tax, which raise the cost of hiring;
policies to reduce immobility: training, relocation grants and more housing;
laws against discrimination and exploitation.
Worked example: wage controls on the model.
Minimum wage of 9 yuan (above the equilibrium of 8): labour supplied $= (9 - 4)/0.02 = 250$; labour demanded $= (16 - 9)/0.04 = 175$. 75 workers who want jobs cannot find them, but the 175 who are employed earn more.
Maximum wage of 6 yuan (below the equilibrium): labour demanded $= (16 - 6)/0.04 = 250$; labour supplied $= (6 - 4)/0.02 = 100$. There is a shortage of 150 workers, and jobs stay empty.
A minimum wage of 9 above the equilibrium: 250 want to work but only 175 are hired, so 75 are unemployedA maximum wage of 6 below the equilibrium: employers want 250 workers but only 100 offer themselves, a shortage of 150
The competitive model predicts that a minimum wage costs jobs. With a monopsony employer, it may not. A monopsonist keeps wages low by hiring fewer workers than a competitive market would. A minimum wage set between the monopsony wage and the competitive wage removes the reason to hold back hiring, so it can raise both wages and employment. This is one explanation for Card and Krueger's New Jersey result. In an exam, weigh the risk of unemployment against the gain in pay for low-paid workers, and say how much power employers have in that market.
Extract. In 2021 the UK ran short of heavy goods vehicle (HGV) drivers, and some petrol stations and supermarkets ran out of stock. The Road Haulage Association estimated a shortage of about 100,000 drivers. Many drivers from other EU countries had left during the pandemic and after Brexit, and tens of thousands of driving tests were cancelled during lockdowns. A new driver needs a special licence, which takes several months and can cost several thousand pounds to obtain. Employers raised pay and some supermarkets offered joining bonuses of £1,000 or more. In September 2021 the government offered 5,000 temporary visas for foreign HGV drivers and increased the number of driving tests.
Questions
(a) Using the extract, explain two factors that reduced the supply of HGV drivers in the UK. [4]
(b) The average HGV driver's annual pay rose from £32,000 to £36,000, while the number of drivers employed rose from 300,000 to 306,000. Calculate the elasticity of labour supply and comment on your answer. [4]
(c) With the help of a labour market diagram, explain the effect of the shortage on drivers' wages and employment. [6]
(d) Examine two causes of labour immobility in the market for HGV drivers. [8]
(e) Evaluate whether temporary visas for foreign workers are a better solution to labour shortages than training more domestic workers. [12]
Model answers
(a) Migration: many EU drivers left the UK during the pandemic and after Brexit, so fewer workers were available. Barriers to qualifying: driving tests were cancelled in lockdowns, so fewer new drivers could get licences; the licence also takes months and costs thousands of pounds. Both shift the supply of labour to the left.
(b) $\%\Delta$ pay $= \tfrac{36{,}000 - 32{,}000}{32{,}000} \times 100 = 12.5\%$; $\%\Delta$ employment $= \tfrac{306{,}000 - 300{,}000}{300{,}000} \times 100 = 2\%$. Elasticity of labour supply $= \tfrac{2}{12.5} = 0.16$. Supply is very inelastic in the short run: a large pay rise attracts few extra drivers, because new drivers need time and money to qualify.
(c) The labour market diagram shows the wage on the vertical axis and the number of drivers on the horizontal axis. The supply of labour shifts left (fewer EU drivers, fewer new licences). At the old wage there is excess demand for drivers (the shortage), so employers bid up wages. The new equilibrium has a higher wage and fewer drivers employed. Because supply is inelastic, the wage rises a lot. Demand for drivers is derived from demand for goods deliveries, which stayed high, so demand did not fall to ease the shortage.
(d) Occupational immobility: workers in other jobs cannot quickly become HGV drivers because they need a special licence, training and a test, which cost time and money. Geographical immobility and working conditions: long hours away from home, poor roadside facilities and the high cost of housing near distribution centres discourage some workers from taking the jobs. Evaluation: occupational barriers fall over time as tests catch up; poor conditions are harder to fix and keep pushing workers out of the job.
(e) For visas: they add qualified workers quickly, which matters in a crisis when shelves are empty and supply is very inelastic. They cost the government little.
Against visas: only 5,000 visas were offered against a shortage of about 100,000, and temporary visas attracted few applicants because drivers were also scarce in other European countries. Relying on migrant workers may keep wages and conditions low, so domestic workers continue to leave. Visas do not fix the underlying causes.
For training: more test capacity and funded training raise the long-run supply of labour and make supply more elastic. Higher pay and better conditions keep drivers in the job. Domestic workers gain jobs and skills.
Against training: it takes months, so it cannot solve an immediate shortage, and it has a cost for the government or firms. Some trained drivers leave because of poor conditions.
Judgement: temporary visas can only ease the short-run crisis, and here they were too few to matter much. Training, faster testing and better pay and conditions are the better long-run solution, because they increase supply permanently. The best policy combines a short-run boost with long-run training, and depends on how quickly the shortage must be filled.
What examiners reward: supply factors tied to the extract, a correct elasticity calculation with interpretation, a labour market diagram with the supply shift and the new wage, causes of immobility that are examined (not just listed), and a time-based judgement.
6.1 6.2
Sources for this lesson
D. Card and A. Krueger, "Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania", American Economic Review 84 (1994).
State Administration for Market Regulation, decision on Alibaba (10 April 2021).
S. Littlechild, Regulation of British Telecommunications' Profitability (1983), the origin of RPI − X.
Shanghai Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, minimum wage notice (2023).
Road Haulage Association statements on the HGV driver shortage (2021).
Pearson Edexcel International A Level Economics specification (WEC13), Issue 2, sections 3.3.4–3.3.5.
6.1 6.2
Common errors
Writing that firms demand labour "because they need workers". Say it is derived from demand for the product.
Putting "price" and "quantity" on a labour market diagram. Label the axes wage rate and number of workers.
Stating that a minimum wage always causes unemployment. In a monopsony it may raise employment.
Mixing up geographical immobility (cannot move place) with occupational immobility (cannot change job).
Describing an RPI − X cap as a fixed price. It allows prices to rise, but by less than inflation.
Listing government measures without judging their effect on price, profit, efficiency, quality and choice.
6.1 6.2
Key terms
Derived demand: demand for labour that comes from demand for the product it makes.
Elasticity of labour supply: % change in labour supplied ÷ % change in the wage.
Geographical / occupational immobility: barriers to moving place / changing job.
RPI − X: a price cap that allows rises of inflation minus X percent.
Regulatory capture: a regulator acting in the interests of the firms it regulates.
Minimum / maximum wage: a legal floor / ceiling on pay.
Monopsony: a single buyer, here a dominant employer.
6.1 6.2
Check yourself
Explain why the demand for delivery drivers rose in 2020.
On the model, labour demand rises to $W = 19 - 0.04L$. Find the new wage and employment.
Give one cause of geographical immobility in China and one policy that could reduce it.
With inflation (RPI) at 4% and X = 3, by how much may a regulated firm raise its prices?
On the model, what happens if the minimum wage is set at 7 yuan?
Explain how a minimum wage could raise employment where a single large employer dominates a town.
Answers: 1. It is derived demand: online shopping and food delivery rose during lockdowns, so firms needed more drivers. 2. $4 + 0.02L = 19 - 0.04L$ gives $L = 250$ and $W = 9$. 3. Hukou rules that limit migrants' access to city schools and healthcare; reform of hukou or more affordable housing in cities. 4. By 1% a year. 5. Nothing: 7 is below the equilibrium wage of 8, so the floor does not bind. 6. The monopsonist hires fewer workers to keep wages low; a minimum wage fixes the wage, so hiring one more worker no longer raises the wage of everyone else, and the firm hires more, up to the point where the supply of labour meets the wage floor.
This package now covers the full IA2 targets of specification sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 (17 objectives: 3.3.4.1a–b, 3.3.4.2c–d, 3.3.4.3a–c, 3.3.4.4a–b, 3.3.5.1a–f, 3.3.5.2a–b), grounded in specification pages 41–42 and the WEC13 January 2024 and June 2023 papers and mark schemes. Read the native introduction first.
Key terms
marginal revenue product 边际收益产品; wage floor 工资下限; derived demand 派生需求; elasticity of demand for labour 劳动需求弹性; net migration 净移民; trade union 工会; minimum wage 最低工资; maximum wage 最高工资; deregulation 放松管制; privatisation 私有化; nationalisation 国有化; regulatory capture 监管俘获.
Supported explanation
Labour demand is derived from the output workers help produce. In the simplified price-taking output model, marginal revenue product (MRP) equals additional physical output times the constant selling price. Compare it with the relevant additional employment cost over the same time period. A wage difference alone does not establish a productivity difference: scarce skills, job conditions, bargaining and discrimination can also matter.
A union can bargain collectively for pay or conditions. Its effect depends on bargaining strength, employer response and the labour-market setting. A minimum wage is a legal wage floor. In the simple competitive model a binding floor can increase labour supplied relative to labour demanded; it does not imply the same employment response under every institutional setting. Competition policy addresses restrictions on competition through investigation and enforceable responses; it cannot be evaluated solely by counting large firms. For each policy identify the objective, mechanism, affected people and a material limitation. These are introductory distinctions, not a substitute for the held detailed wage-setting and competition-policy targets.
Worked case
One additional worker produces eight saleable units per day, each adding 12 currency units of revenue. The wage is 80 currency units/day and additional administration costs 10/day. Calculate the additional contribution before other costs and state a hiring condition.
MRP = 8 units/day × 12 currency units/unit = 96 currency units/day. Additional employment cost = 80 + 10 = 90 currency units/day. The model's additional contribution is 96 − 90 = 6 currency units/day, before any other relevant costs. Hiring is supported only if the output can actually be sold at that marginal revenue and the full additional cost does not exceed the additional revenue. If marginal revenue falls, a constant-price calculation may overstate MRP. This is not an instruction to equate a person's worth with revenue.
Independent transfer
A union negotiates training and a higher wage. A newspaper predicts employment must fall. Evaluate the prediction and distinguish this from a competition-policy decision.
Checked original model
The higher wage raises cost, while useful training may raise saleable output or quality and therefore MRP. The employment effect needs the sizes, timing, product demand and actual employer response. Training attendance alone does not establish a productivity gain. Compare outcomes for workers retained, applicants and consumers. A competition investigation instead needs evidence of restrictive behaviour, entry and alternatives; a wage agreement alone does not establish product-market abuse. The full monopsony, wage-setting and competition-policy models are now taught in the sections below and in topic 5's supplement.
The demand for labour
Labour demand is a derived demand: a firm wants workers only because of the goods or services they produce. The demand curve for an occupation is its marginal revenue product (MRP) — the extra revenue one more worker adds. Demand for labour in an occupation rises when demand for the final product rises, when labour productivity rises, when the product's price rises, and when the wage falls relative to the price of capital (machines become relatively expensive, so firms substitute labour for capital).
The elasticity of demand for labour measures how strongly employment responds to a wage change. Demand is more elastic when capital can easily replace labour, when labour is a large share of total costs, when demand for the final product is price-elastic (a wage rise passed into prices loses many sales), and over longer time periods (firms can reorganise production). A workforce that cannot easily be replaced by capital faces inelastic demand — in the January 2024 WEC13 paper this explained why the elasticity of demand for construction workers was estimated at only −0.18.
The supply of labour
The supply of labour to a particular occupation depends on: the size of the working-age population; net migration (immigration minus emigration); income-tax rates (higher marginal rates can reduce the incentive to work or to enter a profession); the level of welfare benefits (generous out-of-work benefits can lower labour supply); government regulations (licences, qualifications, retirement rules); and trade unions (which can restrict entry or bargain over pay and conditions).
The elasticity of supply of labour to an occupation is higher when entry needs few qualifications and little training, when skills transfer from other jobs, and when workers are geographically mobile. Supply is inelastic for occupations needing long, specific training — surgeons cannot be trained in a month — so wage changes move employment little in the short run.
Wage determination
In a competitive labour market the equilibrium wage and employment sit where labour demand (MRP) meets labour supply. Shifts move both: higher productivity or product demand shifts demand right (higher wage and employment); net migration or lower income tax shifts supply right (lower wage, higher employment). Always read both the wage and the employment change, and say which curve shifted and why.
Wage setting in the public sector and state-owned enterprises 国有企业 works differently: the government is the employer, so pay is set through budgets, national pay scales and independent pay-review bodies rather than by MRP alone. Governments weigh recruitment and retention needs against the opportunity cost of tax revenue, comparability with private-sector pay, and fairness between regions and occupations.
Labour immobility as market failure
Geographical immobility 地理不可流动性 means workers cannot or will not move to where jobs are: causes include housing cost differences, family and social ties, poor transport, and lack of information about distant vacancies. Occupational immobility 职业不可流动性 means workers' skills do not match the jobs on offer: declining industries release workers whose specific skills are not wanted elsewhere, and retraining takes time and money. The consequences are structural unemployment (unfilled vacancies and jobless workers at the same time), persistent regional or occupational wage differences, wasted output, and higher welfare spending.
Government intervention in product markets
The case for intervention rests on market power, inefficiency and unfair outcomes. To control monopolies and mergers, governments use price regulation (such as RPI − X caps that force real price falls), profit regulation, quality standards, performance targets, referral of mergers and conduct to regulatory authorities, and legislation blocking anti-competitive takeovers. To promote competition and contestability they use tax incentives and grants for small businesses and foreign direct investment, deregulation (removing entry rules), privatisation (moving state firms into private ownership), competitive tendering 竞争性招标 for public contracts, and trade liberalisation 贸易自由化 (opening markets to foreign firms). To protect suppliers and employees they can require local sourcing, pass employment-protection legislation, restrict entry of foreign firms, restrict the monopsony power of large buyers, or nationalise a firm.
Each measure must be traced to its effect on price, profit, efficiency, quality and choice — regulation can lower prices and protect quality, but may cut profit-funded investment; privatisation may raise efficiency or may create a private monopoly. And intervention has limits: regulatory capture (the regulator comes to serve the industry it regulates), asymmetric information and information gaps, inadequate resources for enforcement, and weak legal powers. These limits are the bridge to government failure.
Government intervention in labour markets
The case for intervention includes exploitation by powerful employers, inequality, discrimination and immobility. Measures include minimum and maximum wage controls, direct taxes (income tax, national insurance contributions paid by employers and employees, and corporation tax on profits), measures to reduce geographical and occupational immobility (retraining grants, relocation support, better job information), and anti-discrimination and anti-exploitation legislation.
A minimum wage is a legal wage floor. Binding means above the free-market equilibrium. In the model above, demand W = 12 − 0.04L meets supply W = 2 + 0.04L at L$_e$ = 125, W$_e$ = 7. Raising the floor to W$_min$ = 9 contracts the quantity of labour demanded to 75 and extends the quantity supplied to 175: unemployment of 100, shown by the gap, not by the old equilibrium. Note what the examiners demand: when a rate rises, the diagram must show the increase, with a contraction of demand and an extension of supply — not the introduction of a brand-new floor. Employment loss is not automatic in reality: inelastic demand for labour (the construction example above), higher motivation and productivity, and monopsony labour markets all soften it; the January 2024 mark scheme credits exactly these reservations.
A maximum wage is a legal wage ceiling, binding below the equilibrium.
The model predicts a labour shortage — employers want 175 workers at W$_max$ = 5 but only 75 are willing — plus weaker incentives, emigration or resignation of high earners (in Egypt's 2015 public-sector cap, examined in June 2023, banking executives resigned), and evasion through non-pay benefits. Evaluation weighs the fairness aim against these distortions.
Direct taxes work through incentives and costs: employer national-insurance contributions raise the cost of hiring (labour demand falls); income tax affects the return to work (labour supply); corporation tax leaves less profit to fund wages and investment. Mobility measures and anti-discrimination laws attack the immobility and fairness failures directly, but all intervention faces the same government-failure limits listed for product markets.
WEC13 assessment demand for this topic
Section B is a 34-mark source-based question on a supplied figure and extracts: a 2-mark calculation from the data, a 4-mark explanation of a defined term, an 8-mark examine question requiring a diagram (with up to 2 marks of evaluation), a 6-mark analyse question marked 2 knowledge + 2 application + 2 analysis where application means citing the extract's own figures, and a 14-mark discuss question marked 8 (levels) + 6 evaluation (levels). Section A multiple choice has tested the determinants of labour-demand elasticity and the definition of limit pricing. Section C essays (20 marks, 12 + 8 as certified for topic 5) have set maximum-wage and nationalisation evaluations, both requiring diagrams.
Source boundary
XEC11/YEC11, 2018 specification, Issue 2. Evidence: specification pages 41–42 (sections 3.3.4–3.3.5), WEC13 January 2024 QP/MS (Section A Q5–6, Section B Q7 with Figure 1 and Extracts A–B) and WEC13 June 2023 QP/MS (Section C Q8–9). Local authored marking guidance is not an official qualification scheme.
Interactive lessons on this topic
Work through it step by step, with instant-check exercises.