Securing Devices · ⁨การป้องกันอุปกรณ์⁩

Learning Objective 4.1.A: Identify types of computing devices.

• 4.1.A.1 Server computers are devices that provide one or more services to other computers (e.g., DNS, DHCP, FTP). Any computer can be a server, and in an enterprise environment servers typically have more processing power and storage than a personal computer.
• 4.1.A.2 Personal computers are devices that are designed to be used by one person for work or recreational purposes (e.g., word processing, graphic design, web browsing, and media production or viewing). These include desktop, laptop, and notebook computers.
• 4.1.A.3 Handheld computers (also called mobile computers or information appliances) are smaller than personal computers and run on battery power. These include tablets, smartphones, and wearable technology like smart watches.
• 4.1.A.4 Embedded computers are devices that are part of a machine. Embedded devices have specific instruction sets for interfacing with the specialized components of the machine they’re embedded in. Embedded computers tend to be slower and cheaper than other computers and have minimal storage.
• 4.1.A.5 Everyday devices with embedded computers are often called Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Embedded computers are found in transportation (e.g., cars, trains, and airplanes), devices that operate critical infrastructure (e.g., operating circuit breakers at electrical substations and pumps at water treatment plants), medical equipment (e.g., IV pumps, MRI scanners, pacemakers, and insulin pumps), and everyday devices like washing machines, coffee makers, and thermostats.

Learning Objective 4.1.B: Identify the type of malware used in a cyberattack.

• 4.1.B.1 Malware is malicious software that can damage or destroy a device or network, or allow an adversary access to a device and the data on the device.
• 4.1.B.2 Malware is often used as a tool to accomplish part of an adversary’s plan to achieve their ultimate goal(s). There are many types of malware, such as:
  • Viruses are malware that must be activated by a user executing or opening a file.
  • Worms spread from one computer to another without human interaction.
  • Trojans are malware embedded in other software that seems harmless. Remote access trojans (RATs) provide an adversary with remote access to the target system.
  • Ransomware encrypts a device’s files, preventing the user from accessing files on the device. The ransomware typically presents the user with a screen demanding payment and promising to give the user a decryption key for their files if the user pays within a fixed amount of time.
  • Spyware tracks a user’s actions on a computer and sends information back to an adversary.
  • A keylogger is software or hardware that logs the users keystrokes and sends the information back to the adversary. Adversaries can often extract usernames and passwords from keylogger data.
  • Logic bombs are set to trigger their effect only when a specific set of conditions are met; the conditions can include time and date, specific type or version of the operating system, character set the computer is using, etc.
  • A rootkit is sophisticated malware that gets into the target computer’s operating system and can control nearly every aspect of the system, including making the rootkit itself invisible to detection.
• 4.1.B.3 While most malware is a file or a collection of files, fileless malware is malicious code that lives in RAM and uses legitimate programs already installed on a device to compromise it.

Learning Objective 4.1.C: Explain how adversaries can exploit common device vulnerabilities to cause loss, damage, disruption, or destruction.

• 4.1.C.1 Adversaries can develop exploits for known vulnerabilities in software (including operating systems). Devices with unpatched software are vulnerable to these exploits, which could allow an adversary to crash a system, view user actions, enable or disable various services or components on the device (e.g., turning on a webcam or microphone), or even take control of the device to issue their own commands including commands to steal or destroy information on the device.
• 4.1.C.2 Adversaries can take advantage of weak authentication requirements by guessing a user’s password or using social engineering to get a user to divulge their password.
• 4.1.C.3 When systems don’t have a password on the basic input output system (BIOS) or unified extensible firmware interface (UEFI), an adversary can boot a computer into a special mode (e.g., “recovery mode”) that gives them higher-level privileges. Without BIOS or UEFI protection, adversaries can load their own operating system onto a device from an external drive and use specialized tools to alter or create user profiles, including changing user passwords.
• 4.1.C.4 Adversaries can load malware onto an external drive, and if autorun is enabled, then a device will run the malware when the external drive is inserted.
• 4.1.C.5 Adversaries can leverage open ports to connect to a device.
• 4.1.C.6 Adversaries can send malicious data to devices to disrupt them or attempt to take control of them. Devices that have no firewall (or a misconfigured firewall) cannot filter out this malicious data.
• 4.1.C.7 Adversaries often attempt to install malware on a device to disrupt or control it. Devices lacking anti-malware software are more vulnerable to this type of attack.

Learning Objective 4.1.D: Assess and document risks from device vulnerabilities.

• 4.1.D.1 Risk from device vulnerabilities can come from unauthorized access or malware that allow an adversary to impersonate an authorized user, remotely control a device, encrypt a device’s drive to ransom the data, or wipe a device’s memory, destroying data or rendering the device inoperable. The level of risk varies depending on the criticality of the device or the services the device provides or data it stores.
• 4.1.D.2 High risks from device vulnerabilities involve potentially compromising sensitive data or critical operations.
  • Illustrative examples for 4.1.D.2:
    • An organization has not installed the most recent update for their email server which included a patch for a known critical vulnerability.
• 4.1.D.3 Moderate risks from device vulnerabilities can arise from weak authentication requirements or from vulnerabilities that would be less likely to be exploited.
  • Illustrative examples for 4.1.D.3:
    • A water treatment plant has embedded systems controlling pumps. The pumps can be remotely accessed via username and password for remote management for the plant, but the devices do not require multi-factor authentication (MFA).
• 4.1.D.4 Low risks from device vulnerabilities are typically related to vulnerabilities that, if exploited, would have little impact.
  • Illustrative examples for 4.1.D.4:
    • An employee’s laptop has telnet port 23 open.

Learning Objective 4.3.A: Identify managerial controls related to device security.

• 4.3.A.1 An acceptable use policy will describe the range of activities that are permissible, prohibited, or required by users on devices owned by an organization and may include:
  • Prohibiting users from accessing specific websites or types of websites (e.g., social media or gaming)
  • Requiring users to keep software updated
  • Allowing users to connect peripheral devices
  • Prohibiting users from connecting external drives or media
• 4.3.A.2 A password policy will detail the requirements for user passwords within an organization and may include:
  • A minimum or maximum password length
  • A minimum or maximum amount of time a user may keep the same password
  • A prohibition of password reuse
  • Rules for password construction (e.g., no dictionary words and character set requirements)
  • A suggestion to use secure password management tools instead of writing passwords down
• 4.3.A.3 A software installation policy will describe what (if any) software users are allowed to install on their devices and usually also a process for users to request specialized software they may need to perform their role, and it may include:
  • A prohibition against users installing software on their devices
  • A process for users to request new software needed for their role
  • A list of approved software for users

Learning Objective 4.3.B: Explain how anti-malware software can make a device more secure.

• 4.3.B.1 Anti-malware software (sometimes called antivirus software) has tools to quarantine and remove malware that can corrupt, spy on, or destroy a system. Malware contains indicators that make it detectable; these indicators are called signatures.
• 4.3.B.2 Anti-malware software has a database of malware signatures. It periodically scans the files on a device and checks to see if any of the files match any of the signatures in its database. If there is a match, the software quarantines and removes the malicious files.

Learning Objective 4.3.C: Explain why keeping a device’s operating system and software updated makes it more secure.

• 4.3.C.1 When vulnerabilities in operating systems and software are found, the vendor or organization that maintains the operating system software will fix it and send an update. A small update is called a patch.
• 4.3.C.2 Ensuring that a computer’s operating system and software applications are updated to the most recent version prevents adversaries from taking advantage of a known vulnerability.

Learning Objective 4.3.D: Configure a host-based firewall.

• 4.3.D.1 Host-based firewalls allow or deny traffic into or out of a single device. This provides an extra layer of security in case a host is connected to a compromised network.
• 4.3.D.2 A host-based firewall is software that runs on a device and follows a set of rules (an ACL) like a network-based firewall. Firewall rules are implemented in order, applying the first rule that matches.
• 4.3.D.3 A host-based firewall can also block specified types of outbound traffic. Host-based firewalls should always block ports or services not needed for a given device.
  • Illustrative examples for 4.3.D.3:
    • A host-based firewall is configured to block outbound FTP traffic. This prevents an adversary with remote access to the host from using FTP to exfiltrate a file to the adversary’s server.
• 4.3.D.4 The rules for a host-based firewall can allow or deny traffic based on source or destination port or IP address, service, protocol, or application.

Learning Objective 4.4.A: Explain how to detect attacks against devices.

• 4.4.A.1 System processes and settings, login attempts, file download attempts, and user actions are logged by computing systems. These logs can be used to reconstruct circumstances leading up to and during a cyber incident.
• 4.4.A.2 An indicator of compromise (IoC) is evidence that an adversary has compromised a device or network.
• 4.4.A.3 Authentication logs (or auth logs) record every attempted login on a system. Analysis of authentication logs can reveal attempted attacks.
• 4.4.A.4 Host-based IoCs are discovered when analyzing logs and configuration settings. Indicators, such as the following, can be found in authentication logs, user activity logs, and system configuration files:
  • Unusual files being created or modified
  • Unexpected processes or services
  • Unauthorized changes to system configuration settings
  • Unauthorized software installation or update
• 4.4.A.5 File-based IoCs are discovered when analyzing files on a device. Indicators are usually found in executable files and can include:
  • Files whose hash matches known malware
  • File names that are known to be created by a certain piece of malware
  • File paths that are associated with malicious activity
• 4.4.A.6 Behavior-based IoCs are discovered when analyzing logs. Indicators can be found in authentication logs and access logs and can include:
  • Multiple failed login attempts
  • Unusual login times or locations
  • Unauthorized attempts to access sensitive data
  • Attempts to elevate user privileges on a system

Learning Objective 4.4.B: Determine controls for detecting attacks against a device.

• 4.4.B.1 Performance is a criterion for determining a detection method. Detection tools use system memory and processing power and can impact the performance of a device. Anomaly-based detection tools use more system resources than signature-based tools. Signature-based detection is a better option for devices with less powerful system resources. Many embedded devices do not have enough system resources to run any detection tools on the device.
• 4.4.B.2 Cost is a criterion for determining a detection method. Organizations that purchase detection software need to consider the cost of purchasing enough software licenses for the number of devices they need to monitor. Some organizations purchase an endpoint detection and response (EDR) service from a third-party vendor. Although these services are expensive, they provide a holistic, unified approach to threat detection for an organization’s devices; they typically include a centralized alert platform for monitoring possible attacks on devices.
• 4.4.B.3 Sensitivity or criticality of the device is a criterion for determining a detection method. Devices that store or process sensitive information or provide critical services are more likely to be targeted by adversaries and benefit from a hybrid-detection model to offer maximum protection, when possible.

Learning Objective 4.4.C: Evaluate the impact of a device detection method.

• 4.4.C.1 Speed and performance are factors in evaluating the impact of a detection method. Signature-based detection is faster than anomaly-based detection in general, and that effect is compounded on devices, which often lack the processing power to effectively run anomaly-based detection tools. Implementing resource-intensive detection tools on devices can degrade device performance.
• 4.4.C.2 Phase of the attack is a factor in evaluating the impact of a detection method. To carry out actions on a device, adversaries must first bypass a combination of physical- or network-layer protective, deterrent, and detective security controls. Detecting and stopping an attack at the device level can prevent adversaries from accessing sensitive data or disrupting critical services.
• 4.4.C.3 False positives versus ease of bypassing detection is a factor in evaluating the impact of a detection method. Most device-level detection tools are signature-based, and signature-based detection has a low rate of false positives. However, signature-based detection is easier for adversaries to bypass.

Learning Objective 4.4.D: Apply detection techniques to identify indicators of password attacks by analyzing log files.

• 4.4.D.1 Online password attacks can be detected in authentication logs. A single user attempting many wrong passwords is an indicator of an online password attack. If a user:password hash database has been compromised, all the user passwords in the database should be considered insecure and all users should be forced to reset their passwords.
• 4.4.D.2 If an authorized user is logging in from a different location or IP address than expected, or at a different time than normal, this can be an indicator that the user’s password has been compromised.
• 4.4.D.3 An indicator of password spraying is many users trying to log in within seconds of each other from one IP address or from unusual IP addresses.
• 4.4.D.4 An indicator of credential stuffing is a series of default user:password combinations being attempted on a device in quick succession, often from the same IP address.
• 4.4.D.5 Offline password attacks can’t be detected, because the attack takes place on the adversary’s computer.