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AP 网络安全 · 知识点 1

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安全介绍

你可以建造一堵完美的墙。不可破解的加密、每个端口的防火墙、发货当天应用的补丁。对手仍然可以直截了当地走进去…

英语旁白 · 英中内嵌字幕

1.1

理解社会工程学

教学大纲

学习目标 1.1.A: 识别社会工程学策略的常见迹象。

  • 1.1.A.1 社会工程学攻击利用心理战术,诱骗用户泄露敏感信息(诱导)、下载恶意文件或点击恶意链接。社会工程学可以面对面进行,但通常通过电子邮件、短信或社交媒体消息实施。
  • 1.1.A.2 对手经常使用恐吓和紧迫性等心理战术来实现其目标。恐吓是指当目标对象不配合时,对手以负面后果相威胁;紧迫感是指对手制造理由,促使目标对象迅速采取行动。

学习目标 1.1.B: 解释社会工程学策略如何影响受害者执行期望的操作。

  • 1.1.B.1 社会工程学策略依赖于影响人类行为的常见心理学原理。
  • 1.1.B.2 恐吓利用了人类对负面后果的天然厌恶。通过强调可能产生的负面后果,对手利用恐惧来煽动目标对象采取行动。
  • 1.1.B.3 紧迫感利用了人类对时间敏感需求迅速反应的本能。当目标对象在消息中察觉到紧迫感时,会感到压力而被迫迅速回应或行动,这可能导致他们无法花时间考虑该行为是否合理或安全。

学习目标 1.1.C: 描述社会工程学攻击受害者的可能影响。

  • 1.1.C.1 受害者可能会向对手提供个人信息,这些信息可能导致身份冒用,例如姓名、电话号码、地址、工作单位、宠物名称或出生日期。这类信息以及类似信息常被用作网站上的验证问题,以核实用户身份。
  • 1.1.C.2 受害者可能会向对手提供安全信息,如一次性密码 (OTP) 或认证登录代码,这可能允许对手冒充受害者登录服务。
  • 1.1.C.3 受害者可能会下载恶意软件,或点击安装在设备上的恶意软件链接,导致恶意软件从网络浏览器中窃取信息,或将受害者引导至其登录凭据可被对手捕获的网站。

来源:College Board AP 课程与考试说明

English
Phishing: how a fake email steals a password

The weakest part of any computer system is often the human using it. Social engineering 社会工程学 is the art of tricking people into breaking security - giving away a password, opening a bad file, or clicking a bad link. The attacker (we call them an adversary 对手) does not need to break the code; they only need to fool a person.

Most social engineering happens by email, text message, or social media, though it can also happen in person or by phone. The goal is elicitation 套取信息 - getting sensitive information out of someone without them realising.

Adversaries lean on two powerful feelings:

  • Intimidation 恐吓 - the adversary threatens a bad result if you do not obey. Fear pushes you to act.
  • Urgency 紧迫感 - the adversary invents a deadline ("reply in the next hour or your account closes"). When we feel rushed, we stop thinking carefully about whether an action is safe.
Social engineering uses psychological pressure to make a victim act before they think
Social engineering uses psychological pressure to make a victim act before they think

The impact 影响 on a victim can be serious. They might reveal personal details (name, address, pet's name, birthday) that are later used to answer security challenge questions 安全问题 and impersonate 冒充 them. They might hand over a one-time password (OTP) 一次性密码, letting the adversary log in as them. Or they might download malware 恶意软件 that steals data from their browser.

Worked example. A phishing email reads: "Over 90% of staff have already verified their account - confirm yours in the next hour or lose payroll access." Two tactics are stacked here. "In the next hour" is urgency (a deadline that rushes you), and "over 90% of staff have already" is consensus (social pressure to follow the crowd). Naming each tactic - not just calling the email "suspicious" - is exactly what an exam answer needs.

探索

这是哪种社会工程战术?

威胁带来伤害,紧迫制造截止日期,从众声称其他人都在做,权威假装对你拥有权力。

词汇 训练
English 中文 拼音
Social engineering/ˈsəʊʃl ˌendʒɪˈnɪərɪŋ/ 社会工程学 shè huì gōng chéng xué
adversary/ˈædvəsəri/ 对手 duì shǒu
elicitation/ɪˌlɪsɪˈteɪʃn/ 套取信息 tào qǔ xìn xī
Intimidation/ɪnˌtɪmɪˈdeɪʃn/ 恐吓 kǒng hè
Urgency/ˈɜːdʒənsi/ 紧迫感 jǐn pò gǎn
impact/ˈɪmpækt/ 影响 yǐng xiǎng
challenge questions/ˈtʃælɪndʒ ˈkwestʃnz/ 安全问题 ān quán wèn tí
impersonate/ɪmˈpɜːsəneɪt/ 冒充 mào chōng
one-time password (OTP)/wʌn taɪm ˈpæswɜːd/ 一次性密码 yí cì xìng mì mǎ
malware/ˈmælweə/ 恶意软件 è yì ruǎn jiàn
1.2

可疑的网站登录

教学大纲

学习目标 1.2.A: 识别密码攻击的常见迹象。

  • 1.2.A.1 在网络密码攻击中,攻击者尝试使用常用密码、常见密码模式或被盗密码登录设备或服务。
  • 1.2.A.2 网络密码攻击的迹象包括:
    • 短时间内多次登录失败
    • 在异常时间进行登录尝试
    • 从未知设备进行登录尝试

学习目标 1.2.B: 解释攻击者如何利用弱身份验证。

  • 1.2.B.1 许多人在创建密码时使用常见的模式,例如:
    • 以一个或两个单词开头,添加两位数字(通常代表年份),并在末尾加上特殊字符
    • 将家人或宠物的名字包含在密码中
    • 将具有个人意义的日期包含在密码中
  • 1.2.B.2 攻击者经常根据收集到的关于目标的个人信息(例如生日、纪念日、宠物和家人名字)构建一个可能的密码字典,并使用自动化工具提交潜在密码。

学习目标 1.2.C: 解释如何加强身份验证。

  • 1.2.C.1 用户应创建长且随机、唯一的密码。可以使用密码管理器来生成和存储强密码,或者用户可以为自己的账户创建长且唯一的短语密码。
  • 1.2.C.2 创建密码时,用户应避免使用姓名、日期或其他具有个人意义的单词或数字。
  • 1.2.C.3 当可用时,用户应启用多因素身份验证 (MFA),这将在密码之外要求用户提供额外的身份证明——如一次性代码——作为额外的安全层。

来源:College Board AP 课程与考试说明

English
A hardware security key: strong authentication reduces damage when a password is phished
A hardware security key: strong authentication reduces damage when a password is phished

A password attack 密码攻击 is any attempt to log in using guessed or stolen passwords. In an online password attack the adversary tries passwords against a real login page. The warning signs are visible in the logs:

  • many failed logins in a short time,
  • login attempts at unusual hours,
  • login attempts from unknown devices.

Adversaries succeed because people choose weak 弱 passwords. Common patterns include a word plus a two-digit year plus a special character (like Summer24!), or a pet's or family member's name. Because these patterns are so common, an adversary can build a dictionary 字典 of likely passwords from information gathered about you and let an automated tool try each one.

To make authentication 身份验证 stronger:

  • Create passwords that are long, random, and unique - a password manager 密码管理器 can generate and store them for you.
  • Avoid names, dates, and meaningful words.
  • Turn on multifactor authentication (MFA) 多因素身份验证, which asks for extra proof (like a texted code) on top of the password.
词汇 训练
English 中文 拼音
password attack/ˈpæswɜːd əˈtæk/ 密码攻击 mì mǎ gōng jī
weak/wiːk/ 弱 ruò
dictionary/ˈdɪkʃənəri/ 字典 zì diǎn
authentication/ɔːˌθentɪˈkeɪʃn/ 身份验证 shēn fèn yàn zhèng
password manager/ˈpæswɜːd ˈmænɪdʒə/ 密码管理器 mì mǎ guǎn lǐ qì
multifactor authentication (MFA)/ˌmʌltɪˈfæktə ɔːˌθentɪˈkeɪʃn/ 多因素身份验证 duō yīn sù shēn fèn yàn zhèng
1.3

公共网络的最佳实践

教学大纲

学习目标 1.3.A: 识别进行网络攻击的攻击者类型。

  • 1.3.A.1 攻击者可根据其技能水平进行分类。
    • 低技能攻击者依赖他人创建的可在线购买的恶意网络工具。他们使用的工具利用已知的漏洞。
    • 高技能攻击者有能力创建新的恶意网络工具,或修改现有工具以适应新的防御技术和工具。他们还有能力发现未记录的漏洞,即零日漏洞(zero days)。
  • 1.3.A.2 攻击者的动机多种多样,包括贪婪、渴望获得认可、对某种事业的执着、复仇、政治目的或个人信仰。

学习目标 1.3.B: 识别无线网络的攻击类型。

  • 1.3.B.1 在“邪恶双生”(evil twin)攻击中,攻击者建立一个与服务集标识符(SSID)与目标网络相似或相同的无线接入点(WAP);该攻击者的网络被称为“邪恶双生”。此攻击的受害者可能会在不知情的情况下选择连接到“邪恶双生”,从而使攻击者能够捕获其网络流量。攻击者无法读取使用加密协议(如 HTTPS)的流量。
  • 1.3.B.2 在干扰(jamming)攻击中,攻击者在与无线网络相同频率范围内向某一区域发射强电磁(EM)信号,从而阻止接入点(AP)与用户之间的合法流量。这种阻止用户访问资源的攻击类型称为拒绝服务(DoS)攻击。
  • 1.3.B.3 在“战争驾驶”(war driving)攻击中,攻击者在驾车或步行经过目标区域时试图检测无线网络信标。如果检测到无线信号,攻击者可以收集关于所用无线网络类型的信息,并找到无线信号延伸至物理建筑外部的区域。

学习目标 1.3.C: 描述个人在使用互联网和 Wi-Fi 时为增加敏感数据保护可采取的措施。

  • 1.3.C.1 个人应核实其加入的任何无线网络名称是否与其意图连接的无线网络名称完全一致。
  • 1.3.C.2 大多数互联网协议都经过加密以保护网络流量。然而,个人在选择是否连接未加密的 Wi-Fi 网络时,应考虑数据的敏感性,以保护 DNS 查询等易受攻击的数据。
  • 1.3.C.3 个人可考虑使用虚拟专用网络(VPN),它将所有流量加密至 VPN 运营商的系统。尽管这一措施可防止服务提供商查看流量,但 VPN 提供商仍可查看流量。

来源:College Board AP 课程与考试说明

English
A security token: one-time codes and tokens stop password-only logins from being enough
A security token: one-time codes and tokens stop password-only logins from being enough

Not all adversaries are the same. We classify them by skill: low-skilled attackers buy ready-made tools online and reuse known exploits 漏洞利用, while high-skilled attackers write their own tools and can discover brand-new holes called zero days 零日漏洞. Their motivation 动机 varies too - greed, revenge, politics, or belief.

Public Wi-Fi is a favourite hunting ground. Three wireless attacks you must know:

  • Evil twin 双胞胎恶意热点 - the adversary sets up a fake access point 接入点 with a name (SSID 服务集标识符) copied from the real network. Victims connect to the fake one, and the adversary captures their traffic. Valid encrypted 加密的 HTTPS protects the content in transit; this does not prove the hotspot belongs to the school or make every destination trustworthy.
  • Jamming 干扰攻击 - the adversary floods the air with a strong radio signal so no one can connect. This is one kind of denial of service (DoS) 拒绝服务 attack.
  • War driving 驾车无线网络探测 - the adversary drives around detecting wireless networks and where their signal leaks outside a building.

Try it — classify three separate incidents. A school confirms that (A) an unauthorised access point copies its SSID and captures students' traffic, (B) an adversary's transmitter emits a strong signal on the network frequency and prevents legitimate communication, or (C) an adversary drives around recording network beacons and where the signal reaches outside, without connecting. Identify the attack in each case and cite its mechanism.

Worked reasoning. A is an evil twin: it imitates the network's identity to attract connections. B is jamming: the interfering radio signal prevents access, producing denial of service. An outage alone would not prove jamming; the transmitter is part of the given evidence. C is war driving: it gathers wireless-network information without needing to join. Similar observations can be part of an authorised survey, so the purpose and permission matter.

Transfer. A student sees the correct SSID and says, "The name matches, so it must be the school's network. With HTTPS, nothing can go wrong." Explain both overclaims and suggest a separate identity check.

Worked answer. An evil twin can copy the name, so an exact name match is a check rather than proof of ownership. Follow trusted school connection instructions and confirm uncertainties with staff through a separate trusted channel. Valid encrypted HTTPS protects content in transit from someone merely capturing traffic; it does not authenticate the hotspot or make every destination trustworthy. A fake network can still interfere with access or direct users toward a phishing site.

An evil-twin access point copies the real network's name so victims connect to the attacker
An evil-twin access point copies the real network's name so victims connect to the attacker

To protect yourself on public networks: check that the network name exactly matches the one you intend to join, while remembering that this alone does not prove its identity; prefer valid encrypted HTTPS, and consider a virtual private network (VPN) 虚拟专用网络, which encrypts traffic carried through its tunnel to the VPN operator.

词汇 训练
English 中文 拼音
exploits/ˈeksplɔɪts/ 漏洞利用 lòu dòng lì yòng
zero days/ˈzɪərəʊ deɪz/ 零日漏洞 líng rì lòu dòng
motivation/ˌməʊtɪˈveɪʃn/ 动机 dòng jī
Evil twin/ˈiːvl twɪn/ 双胞胎恶意热点 shuāng bāo tāi è yì rè diǎn
access point/ˈækses pɔɪnt/ 接入点 jiē rù diǎn
SSID/ˌes es aɪ ˈdiː/ 服务集标识符 fú wù jí biāo shí fú
encrypted/enˈkrɪptɪd/ 加密的 jiā mì de
Jamming/ˈdʒæmɪŋ/ 干扰攻击 gān rǎo gōng jī
denial of service (DoS)/dɪˈnaɪəl ɒv ˈsɜːvɪs/ 拒绝服务 jù jué fú wù
War driving/wɔː ˈdraɪvɪŋ/ 驾车无线网络探测 jià chē wú xiàn wǎng luò tàn cè
virtual private network (VPN)/ˈvɜːtʃuːəl ˈpraɪvət ˈnetwɜːk/ 虚拟专用网络 xū nǐ zhuān yòng wǎng luò
1.4

基于AI的网络安全攻击

教学大纲

学习目标 1.4.A: 解释对手如何利用人工智能工具增强网络攻击。

  • 1.4.A.1 对手可以使用人工智能工具,利用某人现有的语音和图像样本来创建该人的数字虚拟形象(数字人)。这些技术的使用使对手能够在电话甚至视频通话中冒充他人,从而导致财务损失或敏感/私人信息的泄露。随着越来越多组织采用基于语音的身份验证,语音伪装的影响范围将变得更大。
  • 1.4.A.2 对手可以使用生成式人工智能工具(如大型语言模型 LLMs)以任何目标语言创建极具迷惑性的钓鱼信息。由于传统钓鱼信息有时由非目标语言母语者撰写,不自然的语言特征常被用作区分钓鱼信息与合法信息的依据。然而,借助人工智能工具,对手现在可以编写出读起来如同母语者撰写的、存在于任何语言中的钓鱼信息。
  • 1.4.A.3 对手可以通过精心设计的提示词从大型语言模型中提取安全或敏感信息。大型语言模型中的安全或敏感信息可能来源于用户输入以及用于训练大型语言模型的庞大数据集。
  • 1.4.A.4 对手可以发布网站或修改现有网站以包含虚假信息,从而使这些虚假信息被纳入大型语言模型的数据集中,导致大型语言模型重复传播这些虚假信息。
  • 1.4.A.5 对手可以利用人工智能工具对目标进行侦察,通过扫描互联网收集社交媒体和公共网站上发布的信息。
  • 1.4.A.6 对手可以使用增强型人工智能编码工具来编写新恶意软件、修改现有应用程序代码以执行恶意活动,或在大规模代码库中寻找漏洞。

学习目标 1.4.B: 解释如何防范部分经人工智能增强的网络攻击。

  • 1.4.B.1 应与亲密朋友和家人建立共享秘密,以便相互验证身份。仅由双方知晓的特定单词或短语可用于高风险场景下的身份认证。
  • 1.4.B.2 应启用多因素认证 (MFA)。如果对手克隆了目标的语音以访问具有语音验证功能的系统,要求第二个认证因素可防止对手获取账户权限。
  • 1.4.B.3 不应在任何人工智能工具(如聊天机器人或虚拟助手)中输入个人数据或敏感数据。部分人工智能工具会将用户输入反馈给模型以提供持续训练。对手可能会提取用户在提示词中包含的数据。
  • 1.4.B.4 应仔细评估人工智能工具的输出结果。应使用信誉良好、稳定且非人工智能来源的信息来核实人工智能工具提供的信息。

来源:College Board AP 课程与考试说明

English

Artificial intelligence gives adversaries powerful new tools. With enough voice and image samples, an adversary can build a deepfake 深度伪造 avatar to impersonate someone on a call. Large language models (LLMs) 大语言模型 let them write convincing phishing 钓鱼 emails in perfect, native-sounding language - removing the clumsy wording that once gave scams away.

AI also helps adversaries on the back end: crafting prompts that pull secret data out of an LLM, planting false information on websites so it poisons an LLM's training data, scanning the internet to gather facts about a target, and even writing new malware.

You can defend against many AI-augmented attacks: agree on a shared secret 共享秘密 word with close contacts to verify identity, enable MFA (so a cloned voice alone cannot log in), never type sensitive data into a chatbot, and always double-check AI output against reliable, non-AI sources.

AI writes code, and that cuts both ways. Adversaries use AI-enhanced coding tools 人工智能辅助编程工具 to write new malware faster than they could by hand, to modify existing application code so that it performs malicious activity, and to scan a codebase for vulnerabilities 漏洞 to attack. The skill barrier falls: someone who could not previously write an exploit can now ask for one, so the number of capable attackers rises even when no new technique is invented.

How attackers use AI: phishing, deepfakes and self-changing malware
How attackers use AI: phishing, deepfakes and self-changing malware
词汇 训练
English 中文 拼音
deepfake/ˈdiːpfeɪk/ 深度伪造 shēn dù wěi zào
Large language models (LLMs)/lɑːdʒ ˈlæŋɡwɪdʒ ˈmɒdlz/ 大语言模型 dà yǔ yán mó xíng
phishing/ˈfɪʃɪŋ/ 钓鱼 diào yú
shared secret/ʃeəd ˈsiːkrɪt/ 共享秘密 gòng xiǎng mì mì
AI-enhanced coding tools/ˌeɪ ˈaɪ enˈhænst ˈkəʊdɪŋ tuːlz/ 人工智能辅助编程工具 rén gōng zhì néng fǔ zhù biān chéng gōng jù
vulnerabilities/ˌvʌlnərəˈbɪlɪtiz/ 漏洞 lòu dòng
1.5

在网络防御中运用AI

教学大纲

学习目标 1.5.A: 解释网络防御人员如何利用基于人工智能的工具来保护网络、应用程序和数据。

  • 1.5.A.1 人工智能工具可以审查当前的安全配置(如防火墙规则和访问控制),并推荐更安全的选项。在实施之前,这些建议必须由具备专业知识的安全技术人员进行审核。
  • 1.5.A.2 基于人工智能的工具可以分析应用程序代码以识别漏洞并推荐缓解措施。在实施之前,这些建议必须由具备专业知识的程序员进行审查。
  • 1.5.A.3 基于人工智能的工具可以为自动化检测系统提出规则建议。在将规则添加到系统中之前,必须由具备专业知识的检测工程师进行审核。

学习目标 1.5.B: 解释基于人工智能的工具如何使威胁检测与响应更加快速和准确。

  • 1.5.B.1 网络每天发生数百万次数字事件,其中一些很可能代表对手正在进行恶意活动。人类无法仔细检查所有这些事件来识别恶意活动。
  • 1.5.B.2 基于人工智能的工具可以被训练用于快速分析数字事件,并将可能属于恶意活动的 Events 与无害的 Events 区分开来。
  • 1.5.B.3 基于人工智能的工具可以被编程为:当检测到可能的恶意活动时向人工网络安全人员发出警报,或根据检测到的恶意活动类型采取特定的纠正行动。
  • 1.5.B.4 基于人工智能的工具使威胁检测与响应团队能够及时发现恶意活动并迅速干预,从而防止对数字基础设施和数据造成损失、伤害、破坏及毁灭性后果。

来源:College Board AP 课程与考试说明

English

The same technology defends us. AI tools can analyse an application's own source code, identify vulnerabilities in it and recommend mitigations; they can also review firewall rules and access settings and recommend safer options - though a human expert must always check the advice before applying it. AI can scan application code for weaknesses and suggest detection rules.

⚠️ A recommendation is not a fix. The CED is explicit that the advice must be reviewed and implemented by a knowledgeable programmer: an AI tool can be confidently wrong about whether a flaw is exploitable, and applying a suggested patch without understanding it can introduce a new fault of its own.

Its biggest advantage is scale. A medium network produces millions of events every day - far too many for people to read. AI can quickly sort the harmless events from the likely-malicious ones, alert human staff, or take an automatic action. This lets defenders catch an attack and respond in seconds instead of days, preventing loss and damage.

That scale is what makes threat detection and response 威胁检测与响应 possible in practice: an AI system flags malicious activity as it happens, so the response team can intervene quickly enough to prevent loss, harm, or destruction of digital infrastructure — rather than reading the logs days later and finding out what was taken.

AI in defence learns normal behaviour and flags anomalies for a human to check
AI in defence learns normal behaviour and flags anomalies for a human to check
词汇 训练
English 中文 拼音
threat detection and response/θret dɪˈtekʃn ænd rɪˈspɒns/ 威胁检测与响应 wēi xié jiǎn cè yǔ xiǎng yìng
1.5

考试技巧

English
  • When a question asks you to rank risks, remember high risk = high impact AND easy to exploit. A parking-lot Wi-Fi leak matters less than an open internal port that lets an adversary spoof a device.
  • Learn the social-engineering tactics by name - intimidation, urgency, pretexting, authority, consensus, scarcity, familiarity - and be ready to spot which one an email is using.
  • Valid encrypted HTTPS protects content on an evil twin from passive capture; it does not authenticate the hotspot. Say what is protected and what risk remains.
  • For "how to make authentication stronger", MFA is almost always part of the answer, plus long/unique passwords from a manager.
  • AI is dual-use: the same tool (LLMs, code analysis) appears on both the attack and the defense side. Read the question carefully to see which side it asks about.

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