독점 산출량, 복지 및 효율성
도입됨| English | 의미 |
|---|---|
| monopoly power/məˈnɒpəli ˈpaʊə/ | 독점력 |
| welfare loss/ˈwelfeə lɒs/ | 복지 손실 |
| economic profit/ˌiːkəˈnɒmɪk ˈprɒfɪt/ | 경제적 이윤 |
A decision you can investigate
- A sole supplier can influence price, but customers still buy less when its price rises. It cannot choose price and sales independently.
- Market power does not guarantee profit or remove demand constraints.
Build the explanation
- The pure monopoly model has one supplier in the defined market, no close substitutes and barriers protecting its position. Market definition and alternatives matter; a large firm is not automatically a monopoly. Barriers may involve scale advantages, protected technology, exclusive resources, branding, licences or sunk entry/exit costs. The monopolist faces market demand as AR and has MR below price under uniform pricing. It chooses feasible output where MR=MC at a profit maximum, then reads price from demand; it does not set P=MC as its profit rule.
- Restricted output and a price markup can transfer surplus to the firm and reduce allocative efficiency in a no-externality benchmark. Scale can lower costs, and profits may fund research or better service; weak rivalry may instead permit X-inefficiency or slow innovation. Productive and dynamic efficiency need evidence of attainable cost and actual improvements. Consumers may gain reliable integrated provision or lose choice, surplus and access; neither outcome follows from ownership alone.
Work through the evidence
- A fictional monopoly has P=100−Q, MR=100−2Q and TC=200+20Q, including the required normal return. MR=MC20 gives Q40, price60, TR2400, TC1000 and economic profit1400. Consumer surplus=0.5×(100−60)×40=800.
- The same-demand marginal-benefit/MC benchmark gives Q80 and price20. The unproduced net benefit between40 and80 is0.5×40×40=800. Fixed cost200 is unchanged between these two output comparisons, so net welfare rises2200→3000 if the extra output can be financed and delivered. However, selling all80 at price20 gives revenue1600 against cost1800: marginal-cost pricing does not cover fixed cost200. This is an allocative benchmark, not an automatic viable competitive long-run outcome. At Q40, AC25 exceeds MC20; profit is calculated from TR−TC, not from the price/MC margin alone. AC falls to22.5 at Q80, showing further scale-cost reductions in this toy schedule, not a universal monopoly result; demand and finance still need evaluation.
독점 생산량은 얼마입니까?
난이도 1/5 · 100 코인 + 오늘 첫 완료 시 소액 보너스
100−2Q=20는 Q40을 제공합니다.
지정된 복지 손실은 얼마입니까?
난이도 1/5 · 100 코인 + 오늘 첫 완료 시 소액 보너스
삼각형0.5 × 생산량 격차40 × 한계 가치 격차40 = 800입니다.
독점자는 가격과 판매량을 독립적으로 선택할 수 있다.
난이도 1/5 · 100 코인 + 오늘 첫 완료 시 소액 보너스
수요은 소비자가 구매할 의사와 능력을 가격과 연결시킨다.
Test the limits
- The welfare triangle assumes unchanged demand/cost, no external effects and feasible extra output. It measures lost net benefit, not all monopoly profit or a transfer between consumers and owners. This particular fixed-cost schedule has declining AC; it does not imply every monopoly has that technology.
- Monopoly can make losses if demand is weak or costs high. Entry barriers can protect research incentives yet obstruct new ideas; profits alone do not prove dynamic efficiency. Compare alternatives, resource costs, quality, innovation and regulation. Social cost/benefit and equity may alter the evaluation. A monopoly’s supply choice depends on demand and MR, so it has no unique demand-independent supply curve like a competitive firm’s standard marginal-cost segment.
왜 가격20이此处基准产出80를 조달하지 못하는가?
난이도 1/5 · 100 코인 + 오늘 첫 완료 시 소액 보너스
고정비200는 P=MC임에도 불구하고 유지된다.
Apply and explain your answer
- Why is economic profit1400 rather than the price/MC margin40 times quantity40?
- The margin covers1600 before fixed cost. Subtract fixed economic cost200 to obtain1400.
용어를 의미와 매칭하십시오.
난이도 2/5 · 140 코인 + 오늘 첫 완료 시 소액 보너스
각 용어를 명시된 경제적 관계에 따라 사용하라.
Use the terms precisely
- monopoly power 垄断势力: Ability to influence price in a defined market, constrained by demand and alternatives.
- welfare loss 福利损失: Forgone net social benefit relative to a specified feasible benchmark.
- economic profit 经济利润: Revenue less all economic costs, including normal returns.
A fictional monopoly has P=100−Q, MR=100−2Q and TC=200+20Q, including the required normal return. MR=MC20 gives Q40, price60, TR2400, TC1000 and economic profit1400. Consumer surplus=0.5×(100−60)×40=800. The same-demand marginal-benefit/MC benchmark gives Q80 and price20. The unproduced net benefit between40 and80 is0.5×40×40=800. Fixed cost200 is unchanged between these two output comparisons, so net welfare rises2200→3000 if the extra output can be financed and delivered. However, selling all80 at price20 gives revenue1600 against cost1800: marginal-cost pricing does not cover fixed cost200. This is an allocative benchmark, not an automatic viable competitive long-run outcome. At Q40, AC25 exceeds MC20; profit is calculated from TR−TC, not from the price/MC margin alone. AC falls to22.5 at Q80, showing further scale-cost reductions in this toy schedule, not a universal monopoly result; demand and finance still need evaluation.
The welfare triangle assumes unchanged demand/cost, no external effects and feasible extra output. It measures lost net benefit, not all monopoly profit or a transfer between consumers and owners. This particular fixed-cost schedule has declining AC; it does not imply every monopoly has that technology. Monopoly can make losses if demand is weak or costs high. Entry barriers can protect research incentives yet obstruct new ideas; profits alone do not prove dynamic efficiency. Compare alternatives, resource costs, quality, innovation and regulation. Social cost/benefit and equity may alter the evaluation. A monopoly’s supply choice depends on demand and MR, so it has no unique demand-independent supply curve like a competitive firm’s standard marginal-cost segment.
The pure monopoly model has one supplier in the defined market, no close substitutes and barriers protecting its position. Market definition and alternatives matter; a large firm is not automatically a monopoly. Barriers may involve scale advantages, protected technology, exclusive resources, branding, licences or sunk entry/exit costs. The monopolist faces market demand as AR and has MR below price under uniform pricing. It chooses feasible output where MR=MC at a profit maximum, then reads price from demand; it does not set P=MC as its profit rule.