情報の非対称性と逆選択
導入済み| English | 意味 |
|---|---|
| asymmetric information/ˌeɪsɪˈmetrɪk ˌɪnfəˈmeɪʃn/ | 情報非対称 |
| adverse selection/ædˈvɜːs sɪˈlekʃn/ | 逆選択 |
A decision you can investigate
- An insurer may not observe each applicant’s risk as well as the applicant does. A pension buyer may not understand a fee shown in the small print.
- A missing fact matters through the choice it changes.
Build the explanation
- With symmetric information, parties have comparable relevant knowledge; both can still face uncertainty. Asymmetric information 信息不对称 occurs when one party knows more of the information relevant to the transaction. A broader information gap can cause a consumer to underestimate costs or benefits even when no seller deliberately conceals them.
- Adverse selection 逆向选择 arises before a contract when hidden characteristics influence who chooses it. A pooled insurance price can attract higher-risk applicants and drive lower-risk applicants away. Moral hazard is different: incentives change after protection is obtained, affecting behaviour rather than merely selecting types.
Work through the evidence
- Fictional applicants have expected claims of 200 or 800 currency units per year; initially half are each type. Expected pooled claims=(200+800)/2=500. Ignore administration and profit for this example. If low-risk applicants reject a premium of 500 because their expected claim is 200, only high-risk applicants remain and expected claims rise to 800.
- This selection story assumes applicants know their type and make the stated choice. Insurance also transfers risk; expected claims alone do not determine willingness to pay. For a separate pension case, an unrecognized fee of 1% on a balance of 10000 is 100 in the stated year, before returns. A repeated percentage fee acts on changing balances, so multiplying 100 by the number of years is not a general projection.
初期のプール化された見込請求額はいくつですか？
難易度 1/5 · 100 コイン + 今日初回完了時に小ボーナス付与
同様のタイプ割合がある場合、平均値は 500 である。
Test the limits
- Health decisions can omit treatment risks or long-term prevention benefits; education choices can misjudge course quality or returns; pension choices can omit fees, inflation or withdrawal restrictions. Explain which fact is missing and how the decision changes, rather than asserting that all consumers are uninformed.
- Disclosure, independent advice, quality standards or risk assessment may help, but comprehension, cost, privacy and unequal access matter. There can be legitimate limits on information collection. A price change alone cannot tell us whether selection, uncertainty or moral hazard caused an observed outcome.
高リスク申請者だけが残り残った場合、この場合の彼らの見込請求額はいくつになりますか？
難易度 1/5 · 100 コイン + 今日初回完了時に小ボーナス付与
残り残ったタイプの見込請求額は 800 である。
逆選択とモラルハザードは同一のメカニズムを指す。
難易度 1/5 · 100 コイン + 今日初回完了時に小ボーナス付与
選抜問題は隠れたタイプが契約に参加することに関するものであり、モラルハザードは保護下でのインセンティブの変化に関するものである。
Apply and explain your answer
- Distinguish the insurer’s selection problem from a policyholder taking fewer precautions after buying cover.
- Hidden risk types influence who buys cover before contracting; reduced precautions after cover reflect changed incentives and moral hazard.
対称的不確実性を説明するのはどれか？
難易度 1/5 · 100 コイン + 今日初回完了時に小ボーナス付与
共有的不確実性は必ずしも情報非対称性である必要はない。
Use the terms precisely
- asymmetric information: One party has more relevant information than another in a decision or transaction.
- adverse selection: Hidden characteristics affect who enters a transaction, potentially worsening the pool.
用語とそれぞれの意味を結びつけよ。
難易度 2/5 · 140 コイン + 今日初回完了時に小ボーナス付与
各用語を、その明示された経済的関係に用いること。
Fictional applicants have expected claims of 200 or 800 currency units per year; initially half are each type. Expected pooled claims=(200+800)/2=500. Ignore administration and profit for this example. If low-risk applicants reject a premium of 500 because their expected claim is 200, only high-risk applicants remain and expected claims rise to 800. This selection story assumes applicants know their type and make the stated choice. Insurance also transfers risk; expected claims alone do not determine willingness to pay. For a separate pension case, an unrecognized fee of 1% on a balance of 10000 is 100 in the stated year, before returns. A repeated percentage fee acts on changing balances, so multiplying 100 by the number of years is not a general projection.
Health decisions can omit treatment risks or long-term prevention benefits; education choices can misjudge course quality or returns; pension choices can omit fees, inflation or withdrawal restrictions. Explain which fact is missing and how the decision changes, rather than asserting that all consumers are uninformed. Disclosure, independent advice, quality standards or risk assessment may help, but comprehension, cost, privacy and unequal access matter. There can be legitimate limits on information collection. A price change alone cannot tell us whether selection, uncertainty or moral hazard caused an observed outcome.
With symmetric information, parties have comparable relevant knowledge; both can still face uncertainty. Asymmetric information occurs when one party knows more of the information relevant to the transaction. A broader information gap can cause a consumer to underestimate costs or benefits even when no seller deliberately conceals them.