Information and market power
Introduzido| English | Significado |
|---|---|
| asymmetric information/ˌeɪsɪˈmetrɪk ˌɪnfəˈmeɪʃn/ | A situation in which parties to a transaction possess different relevant information. |
| adverse selection/ædˈvɜːs sɪˈlekʃn/ | Seleção adversa |
| moral hazard/ˈmɒrəl ˈhæzəd/ | Risco moral |
| signalling/ˈsɪɡnəlɪŋ/ | Prices communicating information about scarcity and changing demand or supply to buyers and sellers. |
| perfect competition/ˈpɜːfekt ˌkɒmpəˈtɪʃn/ | A market with many firms, an identical product, and free entry. |
| monopoly/məˈnɒpəli/ | A market structure in which a single seller supplies a good or service with no close substitutes. |
| barriers to entry/ˈbærɪəz tʊ ˈentri/ | Obstacles that make it difficult for new firms to enter a market. |
| oligopoly/ˌɒlɪˈɡɒpəli/ | A market dominated by a small number of interdependent large firms. |
| market power/ˈmɑːkɪt ˈpaʊə/ | The ability of a seller or buyer to influence market prices or trading conditions. |
| collude | For firms to agree secretly to fix prices or share markets instead of competing. |
The market for lemons, 1970
- In 1970 George Akerlof showed why used-car markets break down. Sellers know if their car is a "lemon"; buyers do not, so they offer only an average price — and owners of good cars stop selling.
- Three journals rejected the paper as too obvious. It won Akerlof the Nobel Prize in 2001, and it is the base of the economics of asymmetric information 信息不对称.
Asymmetric information
- One side of a deal knows more than the other. Adverse selection 逆向选择 happens before the deal: the riskiest people are the keenest to buy insurance. Moral hazard 道德风险 happens after it: an insured driver may take less care.
- Fixes include signalling 信号传递 (warranties, qualifications), screening (medical checks, credit scores) and regulation (compulsory disclosure, licensing).

Match each case to the problem it shows.
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Adverse selection is hidden information before the deal; moral hazard is hidden action after it.
In Akerlof's model, why do owners of good used cars leave the market?
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Buyers cannot tell quality, so the average price undervalues good cars.
Market structures
- In perfect competition 完全竞争 many small firms sell identical products and none can set the price. At the other extreme a monopoly 垄断 is the only seller, protected by barriers to entry 进入壁垒: patents, huge fixed costs, control of resources or law.
- Between them are monopolistic competition (many firms, differentiated products — cafés) and oligopoly 寡头垄断 (a few large firms — mobile networks, airlines).
Match each market to its structure.
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Count the firms and ask whether the products differ.
Market power
- A firm with market power 市场势力 faces a downward-sloping demand curve, so it can raise price by restricting output. A profit-maximising monopolist produces where marginal revenue = marginal cost, at a higher price and lower quantity than a competitive market.
- The result is allocative inefficiency and a welfare loss — but large firms may also gain economies of scale and fund research.
Worked example: monopoly against competition
Demand is $P = 100 - Q$ and marginal cost is constant at 20. Compare a competitive market with a monopoly. (For this demand, $MR = 100 - 2Q$.)
- Competition: $P = MC$: $100 - Q = 20$, so $Q = 80$ and $P = 20$.
- Monopoly: $MR = MC$: $100 - 2Q = 20$, so $Q = 40$ and $P = 100 - 40 = 60$. Profit $= (60 - 20) \times 40 = 1600$.
- Welfare loss: the 40 units not made were worth more to buyers than they cost: the triangle $\tfrac{1}{2} \times 40 \times (60 - 20) = 800$.
Demand is $P = 60 - Q$, so $MR = 60 - 2Q$, and marginal cost is 10. What quantity does a monopolist produce?
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$60 - 2Q = 10$, so $Q = 25$ (at a price of 35).
With demand $P = 60 - Q$ and marginal cost 10, what quantity would a competitive market produce?
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$P = MC$: $60 - Q = 10$, so $Q = 50$ — twice the monopoly output.
Oligopoly and collusion
- In an oligopoly each firm's best choice depends on its rivals, which game theory models. Firms are tempted to collude 串谋 — agree to fix prices — but each also gains by cheating on the deal.
- Collusion is illegal in most countries. In 2016–17 the EU fined truck makers a total of €3.8 billion for a 14-year cartel, and China's anti-monopoly law (2008) fined Alibaba ¥18.2 billion in 2021 for abusing its market position.
Once oligopolists agree to fix a high price, each firm has no reason to cheat.
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Each firm gains by secretly cutting its price to win sales, which is why cartels are unstable.
Government responses
- Competition law blocks mergers that would cut competition and punishes cartels. Natural monopolies such as water networks are often regulated with price caps or kept in public ownership.
- Each response has costs: regulators may lack information, and breaking up a firm can destroy economies of scale.
Which are ways governments limit market power?
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A longer patent increases market power.
"A monopoly can charge any price it likes" is wrong. It still faces the demand curve: a higher price means fewer sales. It chooses the price where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, and that price is limited by how much buyers are willing to pay.
When one side knows more, markets suffer adverse selection and moral hazard; signals, screening and regulation help. Market power lets firms restrict output and raise price, causing a welfare loss. Oligopolists are tempted to collude, so competition law, regulation and public ownership are used to protect buyers.
Evaluate whether a government should break up a dominant online shopping platform.
Weigh both sides and decide.