1.1 Being human

Name: _____ Class: _____ Date: _____ **Total: 26 marks**

KEY WORDS personal identity • free will

Being human

Objective

Analyse arguments (premises, conclusion, validity, soundness), apply the identity and personhood theories with their counter-cases, and evaluate the free-will positions and the mind–body arguments (core theme: being human).

1 Key knowledge and worked examples

Core toolkit. Argument: premises support a conclusion; VALID is about form, SOUND adds true premises; deduction vs induction; fallacies – begging the question, straw man, false dilemma, appeal to authority. Thought experiments as stress tests. Identity: body theory (Theseus), memory theory (Locke; Reid's brave officer – memory not transitive), psychological continuity (Parfit; the teleporter – survival without identity). Personhood: rational agency, consciousness, relationships – a moral, not biological, category. Freedom: hard determinism, libertarianism, compatibilism (freedom as the right causal history); Frankfurt's unwilling addict; the manipulation case. Mind: dualism vs physicalism; Mary the scientist; the zombie.

2 Practice

2.1 Distinguish validity from soundness. [2]

2.2 Name the fallacy: "Free will must exist, because people make free choices every day." [2]

2.3 State Locke's memory theory and Reid's counter-case against it. [3]

2.4 Distinguish a human from a person, and say why the distinction matters morally. [2]

2.5 State the compatibilist account of a free act. [2]

3 Exam-style questions

3.1 *(Argument analysis style.)* Analyse: "Every event has a cause, so my choices have causes, so I am not free." Identify the premises and conclusion, test validity, and name the suppressed premise. [6]

3.2 *(Essay style.)* "Personal identity is not what matters." Using the teleporter thought experiment, evaluate Parfit's claim. [5]

3.3 *(Mind style.)* What does Mary the colour scientist learn when she first sees red, and what does the case show against physicalism – and what must the physicalist reply? [4]

Solutions

2.1 Validity: the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises (form, whatever the truth) (1); soundness: valid AND the premises true (1).

2.2 Begging the question – the conclusion (free choices exist) is smuggled into the premise (people make free choices) (2).

2.3 A person at one time is identical with a being at another just if the later can remember the earlier's experiences (2). Reid's brave officer: the general remembers the officer, the officer remembers the boy, but the general does not remember the boy – if identity is transitive but memory is not, memory cannot constitute identity (1).

2.4 Human is the biological category; person the moral one – a being with rational agency, consciousness, capacity for relationship (1). The distinction matters because rights and protections track personhood claims (infants, end-of-life, animals, machines); the edges of the criteria are where the ethics is decided (1).

2.5 A free act is one caused in the right way: by the agent's own desires and reasons, without coercion or constraint (2).

3.1 Premises: P1 every event has a cause (and, as used, choices are events); conclusion: I am not free (2). Validity: the inference requires a suppressed premise – caused choices are not free – without it the conclusion does not follow (2). The suppressed premise is precisely what compatibilism denies: a compatibilist accepts caused choices that are free when caused by the agent's own reasons (2). The argument is valid only given its suppressed premise and so begs the question against the compatibilist – the analysis the craft marks.

3.2 Parfit: identity is one-one, but psychological continuity can branch – the teleporter (or fission) cases show survival-relation without strict identity (2). If survival is what matters in continuing, and survival can hold where identity does not (branching, gradual replacement), then identity is not what matters (2). Evaluate: the thought experiment assumes continuity is what we care about – but anticipation of future experience, responsibility and promise all seem to track identity in practice; the physicalist body theorist will deny the cases are coherent. Judgement: Parfit shows the concept frays at the edges, and that our practices, not metaphysics, fix what matters (accept any reasoned weighing engaging the objection) (1).

3.3 On seeing red, Mary learns WHAT IT IS LIKE to see red – a phenomenal fact, a new experience, not a new physical fact (2). The case shows: if she knew all the physical facts beforehand and still learns something, some facts are not physical – physicalism false (1). The physicalist replies: she gains a new ABILITY (to recognise, imagine, remember) or a new mode of presentation of an old fact, not a new fact – the argument assumes that learning an experience is learning a fact, which is the point in dispute (1).

Local review guidance: name the parts before testing the form; the suppressed premise is worth its own sentence; (R1 3.2/3.3) an evaluation names what the thought experiment ASSUMES; the physicalist reply targets the assumption, not the intuition. Authored guidance.