Exercise walk-through

4.1
HL unseen text and normative bridges: supported rehearsal

International Baccalaureate · IB Diploma · Philosophy · HL

Philosophy and contemporary issues

- explain what philosophy does: **conceptual analysis**, argument and thought experiments;
- distinguish conceptual questions from empirical ones;
- discuss philosophical issues in artificial intelligence, the environment and technology;
- respond to an unseen text in Paper 3 in four steps.

Contemporary issues


- The debate connects to personhood (topic 01): if an AI had a mind, would it have rights?
- And to responsibility: when an AI system causes harm, who is to blame?
- Derek Parfit's **non-identity problem** : our policies today change which people will be born in the future.
- If a careless policy leads to different people being born, none of them is worse off than they would otherwise have been, because otherwise they would not exist.

Answering Paper 3 (2)


- Evaluation: Searle's **Chinese room** shows that behaviour and understanding can come apart; but a functionalist would reply that understanding just is the right kind of behaviour.
- Reflection: science can tell us what the systems do; philosophy must decide what would *count* as thinking. The text shows why philosophy remains necessary even when the technology advances.

Exercises 2.1·2.2

2.1 Name the three conceptions of philosophical activity from the handout. [3]



2.2 What is the a priori's business, as against science's? [2]




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2.1 Conceptual analysis (unpacking the concepts an issue runs on); argument (premises, validity, suppressed premises); the a priori study of the possible (3).

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


2.2 Philosophy asks what could be, what must be, what is consistent; science asks what IS the case (settled by observation) (2).


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Exercises 2.3·2.4

2.3 What does the Turing test test, and what does the Chinese room claim to show? [2]




2.4 State the non-identity problem in one sentence. [2]




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2.3 The Turing test tests behaviour – indistinguishable conversation as the criterion; the Chinese room claims to show that symbol-manipulation without understanding passes such tests, so behaviour is not thinking (2).

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


2.4 Policies determining who will exist make particular future persons impossible to harm in the ordinary (counterfactual) way – they would not otherwise have existed (2).

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
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2.5 What is the experimental-philosophy challenge to intuitions? [2]



Exercise 2.5


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2.5 If intuitions (about cases, about concepts) vary across cultures and groups, what weight can they carry as evidence in philosophical argument – are they data about the concept or about the thinkers? (2).


Exercise 3.1

3.1 *(Meta style.)* "Can a machine think?" Split the question into its conceptual and empirical parts, and state philosophy's function in the debate. [4]



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
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3.1 Empirical part: what the system does – its outputs, architecture, performance (science's question) (1). Conceptual part: what would COUNT as thinking – the criteria (understanding, intentionality, perhaps consciousness) that make performance into thought (1). Philosophy's function: keeping the split visible – settling which question is being asked before answering either (1). The contemporary debate confuses itself wherever the parts blur: passing the test (empirical) is read as meeting the criteria (conceptual) without argument (1).


Exercise 3.2

3.2 *(Issue style.)* Develop the non-identity analysis: the conceptual claim, the argument it generates, the rights objection, and the meta-point the case shows about philosophy's work. [6]



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
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3.2 Conceptual claim: harm requires a counterfactual – a person is harmed only if they are worse off than they otherwise would have been (2). Argument: depletion policies shape the timing of conception, so the depleted future people would not exist otherwise – no particular person is harmed – so (the argument concludes) depletion wrongs no one (2). Rights objection: whoever exists has rights – each future person has a right to a liveable world, whoever they turn out to be; wronging does not require a named victim (1). Meta-point: the paradox is conceptual – no data settle it; this is philosophy's distinctive work, clarifying what "harm" and "right" mean under conditions science describes (1).


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3.3 *(Issue style.)* A recommendation engine shapes what users see and choose. Using compatibilism, evaluate whether the nudged choice is still the user's own. [4]



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3.3 Compatibilism: a choice is the user's own when caused the right way – by the user's desires and reasons, without coercion (2). The engine does not coerce: options remain, and the user's reasons still operate – so the nudged choice is the user's own in the compatibilist sense (1). But the manipulation case returns: the nudge SHAPES the desires the criterion appeals to – the "right way" is engineered – so the compatibilist must say why designed desires are still the user's, and this is where the extension's debate lives (1).

Local review guidance: name the two parts before the function; (R1 3.2) the meta-point is philosophy's work, not the objection's; (R1 3.3) the evaluation pushes the theory to its own hard case. Authored guidance.