Exercise walk-through

1.1 Premises and personhood: supported rehearsal

International Baccalaureate · IB Diploma · Philosophy · HL

Personhood

- **Personhood** is a moral idea, not a biological one.
- A **human** is a member of our species; a **person** is a being with certain abilities: consciousness, reason, self-awareness, communication, moral responsibility.
- The two groups may not match exactly.
- Some philosophers argue that great apes or future AI might be persons; others ask whether newborn babies or people in a coma meet the criteria.

Freedom


- The **free will** problem: if every event has a cause, can any choice be free?
- *The three positions answer two different questions: is determinism true, and could **free will** exist if it were?*
- Harry Frankfurt's "unwilling addict" helps the compatibilist: the addict takes the drug, but wishes he did not want it.
- He is unfree not because his act was caused, but because he acts on a desire he rejects.

Sources for this lesson


- International Baccalaureate, *__Philosophy__ guide* (first assessment 2024) and subject brief.
- J. M. Harlow, "Recovery from the passage of an iron bar through the head", *Publications of the Massachusetts Medical Society* (1868).
- J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (2nd edition, 1694), book II, chapter 27; T. Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (1785).

Exercises 2.1·2.2

2.1 Distinguish validity from soundness. [2]




2.2 Name the fallacy: "Free will must exist, because people make free choices every day." [2]




Exercises 2.1·2.2

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2.1 Validity: the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises (form, whatever the truth) (1); soundness: valid AND the premises true (1).


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
2.2 Begging the question – the conclusion (free choices exist) is smuggled into the premise (people make free choices) (2).

Exercises 2.3·2.4

2.3 State Locke's memory theory and Reid's counter-case against it. [3]




2.4 Distinguish a human from a person, and say why the distinction matters morally. [2]




Exercises 2.3·2.4

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2.3 A person at one time is identical with a being at another just if the later can remember the earlier's experiences (2). Reid's brave officer: the general remembers the officer, the officer remembers the boy, but the general does not remember the boy – if identity is transitive but memory is not, memory cannot constitute identity (1).


2.4 Distinguish a human from a person, and say why the distinction matters morally. [2]



2.4 Human is the biological category; person the moral one – a being with rational agency, consciousness, capacity for relationship (1). The distinction matters because rights and protections track personhood claims (infants, end-of-life, animals, machines); the edges of the criteria are where the ethics is decided (1).


Exercise 2.5

2.5 State the compatibilist account of a free act. [2]



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
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2.5 A free act is one caused in the right way: by the agent's own desires and reasons, without coercion or constraint (2).


Exercise 3.1

3.1 *(Argument analysis style.)* Analyse: “Every event has a cause, so my choices have causes, so I am not free.” Identify the premises and conclusion, test validity, and name the suppressed premise. [6]



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
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3.1 Premises: P1 every event has a cause (and, as used, choices are events); conclusion: I am not free (2). Validity: the inference requires a suppressed premise – caused choices are not free – without it the conclusion does not follow (2). The suppressed premise is precisely what compatibilism denies: a compatibilist accepts caused choices that are free when caused by the agent’s own reasons (2). The argument is valid only given its suppressed premise and so begs the question against the compatibilist – the analysis the craft marks.


Exercise 3.2

3.2 *(Essay style.)* "Personal identity is not what matters." Using the teleporter thought experiment, evaluate Parfit's claim. [5]



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
3.2 *(Essay style.)* "Personal identity is not what matters." Using the teleporter thought experiment, evaluate Parfit's claim. [5]



3.2 Parfit: identity is one-one, but psychological continuity can branch – the teleporter (or fission) cases show survival-relation without strict identity (2). If survival is what matters in continuing, and survival can hold where identity does not (branching, gradual replacement), then identity is not what matters (2). Evaluate: the thought experiment assumes continuity is what we care about – but anticipation of future experience, responsibility and promise all seem to track identity in practice; the physicalist body theorist will deny the cases are coherent. Judgement: Parfit shows the concept frays at the edges, and that our practices, not metaphysics, fix what matters (accept any reasoned weighing engaging the objection) (1).


Exercise 3.3

3.3 *(Mind style.)* What does Mary the colour scientist learn when she first sees red, and what does the case show against physicalism – and what must the physicalist reply? [4]



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3.3 On seeing red, Mary learns WHAT IT IS LIKE to see red – a phenomenal fact, a new experience, not a new physical fact (2). The case shows: if she knew all the physical facts beforehand and still learns something, some facts are not physical – physicalism false (1). The physicalist replies: she gains a new ABILITY (to recognise, imagine, remember) or a new mode of presentation of an old fact, not a new fact – the argument assumes that learning an experience is learning a fact, which is the point in dispute (1).

Local review guidance: name the parts before testing the form; the suppressed premise is worth its own sentence; (R1 3.2/3.3) an evaluation names what the thought experiment ASSUMES; the physicalist reply targets the assumption, not the intuition. Authored guidance.